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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 17:04:52 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 17:04:52 +0000
commit5e03c718f4e7ff13cb6834eda737c269ebed02ad (patch)
treebfad3f5be123f000fdb03e26400050dece33d72f /src/cookies.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadwget-upstream.tar.xz
wget-upstream.zip
Adding upstream version 1.21.3.upstream/1.21.3upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/cookies.c')
-rw-r--r--src/cookies.c1539
1 files changed, 1539 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/cookies.c b/src/cookies.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d903d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/cookies.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1539 @@
+/* Support for cookies.
+ Copyright (C) 2001-2011, 2015, 2018-2022 Free Software Foundation,
+ Inc.
+
+This file is part of GNU Wget.
+
+GNU Wget is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at
+your option) any later version.
+
+GNU Wget is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+General Public License for more details.
+
+You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+along with Wget. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+Additional permission under GNU GPL version 3 section 7
+
+If you modify this program, or any covered work, by linking or
+combining it with the OpenSSL project's OpenSSL library (or a
+modified version of that library), containing parts covered by the
+terms of the OpenSSL or SSLeay licenses, the Free Software Foundation
+grants you additional permission to convey the resulting work.
+Corresponding Source for a non-source form of such a combination
+shall include the source code for the parts of OpenSSL used as well
+as that of the covered work. */
+
+/* Written by Hrvoje Niksic. Parts are loosely inspired by the
+ cookie patch submitted by Tomasz Wegrzanowski.
+
+ This implements the client-side cookie support, as specified
+ (loosely) by Netscape's "preliminary specification", currently
+ available at:
+
+ http://wp.netscape.com/newsref/std/cookie_spec.html
+
+ rfc2109 is not supported because of its incompatibilities with the
+ above widely-used specification. rfc2965 is entirely ignored,
+ since popular client software doesn't implement it, and even the
+ sites that do send Set-Cookie2 also emit Set-Cookie for
+ compatibility. */
+
+#include "wget.h"
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBPSL
+# include <libpsl.h>
+#endif
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "cookies.h"
+#include "http.h" /* for http_atotm */
+#include "c-strcase.h"
+
+
+/* Declarations of `struct cookie' and the most basic functions. */
+
+/* Cookie jar serves as cookie storage and a means of retrieving
+ cookies efficiently. All cookies with the same domain are stored
+ in a linked list called "chain". A cookie chain can be reached by
+ looking up the domain in the cookie jar's chains_by_domain table.
+
+ For example, to reach all the cookies under google.com, one must
+ execute hash_table_get(jar->chains_by_domain, "google.com"). Of
+ course, when sending a cookie to `www.google.com', one must search
+ for cookies that belong to either `www.google.com' or `google.com'
+ -- but the point is that the code doesn't need to go through *all*
+ the cookies. */
+
+struct cookie_jar {
+ /* Cookie chains indexed by domain. */
+ struct hash_table *chains;
+
+ int cookie_count; /* number of cookies in the jar. */
+};
+
+/* Value set by entry point functions, so that the low-level
+ routines don't need to call time() all the time. */
+static time_t cookies_now;
+
+struct cookie_jar *
+cookie_jar_new (void)
+{
+ struct cookie_jar *jar = xnew (struct cookie_jar);
+ jar->chains = make_nocase_string_hash_table (0);
+ jar->cookie_count = 0;
+ return jar;
+}
+
+struct cookie {
+ char *domain; /* domain of the cookie */
+ int port; /* port number */
+ char *path; /* path prefix of the cookie */
+
+ unsigned discard_requested :1;/* whether cookie was created to
+ request discarding another
+ cookie. */
+
+ unsigned secure :1; /* whether cookie should be
+ transmitted over non-https
+ connections. */
+ unsigned domain_exact :1; /* whether DOMAIN must match as a
+ whole. */
+
+ unsigned permanent :1; /* whether the cookie should outlive
+ the session. */
+ time_t expiry_time; /* time when the cookie expires, 0
+ means undetermined. */
+
+ char *attr; /* cookie attribute name */
+ char *value; /* cookie attribute value */
+
+ struct cookie *next; /* used for chaining of cookies in the
+ same domain. */
+};
+
+#define PORT_ANY (-1)
+
+/* Allocate and return a new, empty cookie structure. */
+
+static struct cookie *
+cookie_new (void)
+{
+ struct cookie *cookie = xnew0 (struct cookie);
+
+ /* Both cookie->permanent and cookie->expiry_time are now 0. This
+ means that the cookie doesn't expire, but is only valid for this
+ session (i.e. not written out to disk). */
+
+ cookie->port = PORT_ANY;
+ return cookie;
+}
+
+/* Non-zero if the cookie has expired. Assumes cookies_now has been
+ set by one of the entry point functions. */
+
+static bool
+cookie_expired_p (const struct cookie *c)
+{
+ return c->expiry_time != 0 && c->expiry_time < cookies_now;
+}
+
+/* Deallocate COOKIE and its components. */
+
+static void
+delete_cookie (struct cookie *cookie)
+{
+ xfree (cookie->domain);
+ xfree (cookie->path);
+ xfree (cookie->attr);
+ xfree (cookie->value);
+ xfree (cookie);
+}
+
+/* Functions for storing cookies.
+
+ All cookies can be reached beginning with jar->chains. The key in
+ that table is the domain name, and the value is a linked list of
+ all cookies from that domain. Every new cookie is placed on the
+ head of the list. */
+
+/* Find and return a cookie in JAR whose domain, path, and attribute
+ name correspond to COOKIE. If found, PREVPTR will point to the
+ location of the cookie previous in chain, or NULL if the found
+ cookie is the head of a chain.
+
+ If no matching cookie is found, return NULL. */
+
+static struct cookie *
+find_matching_cookie (struct cookie_jar *jar, struct cookie *cookie,
+ struct cookie **prevptr)
+{
+ struct cookie *chain, *prev;
+
+ chain = hash_table_get (jar->chains, cookie->domain);
+ if (!chain)
+ goto nomatch;
+
+ prev = NULL;
+ for (; chain; prev = chain, chain = chain->next)
+ if (0 == strcmp (cookie->path, chain->path)
+ && 0 == strcmp (cookie->attr, chain->attr)
+ && cookie->port == chain->port)
+ {
+ *prevptr = prev;
+ return chain;
+ }
+
+ nomatch:
+ *prevptr = NULL;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Store COOKIE to the jar.
+
+ This is done by placing COOKIE at the head of its chain. However,
+ if COOKIE matches a cookie already in memory, as determined by
+ find_matching_cookie, the old cookie is unlinked and destroyed.
+
+ The key of each chain's hash table entry is allocated only the
+ first time; next hash_table_put's reuse the same key. */
+
+static void
+store_cookie (struct cookie_jar *jar, struct cookie *cookie)
+{
+ struct cookie *chain_head;
+ char *chain_key;
+
+ if (hash_table_get_pair (jar->chains, cookie->domain,
+ &chain_key, &chain_head))
+ {
+ /* A chain of cookies in this domain already exists. Check for
+ duplicates -- if an extant cookie exactly matches our domain,
+ port, path, and name, replace it. */
+ struct cookie *prev;
+ struct cookie *victim = find_matching_cookie (jar, cookie, &prev);
+
+ if (victim)
+ {
+ /* Remove VICTIM from the chain. COOKIE will be placed at
+ the head. */
+ if (prev)
+ {
+ prev->next = victim->next;
+ cookie->next = chain_head;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* prev is NULL; apparently VICTIM was at the head of
+ the chain. This place will be taken by COOKIE, so
+ all we need to do is: */
+ cookie->next = victim->next;
+ }
+ delete_cookie (victim);
+ --jar->cookie_count;
+ DEBUGP (("Deleted old cookie (to be replaced.)\n"));
+ }
+ else
+ cookie->next = chain_head;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* We are now creating the chain. Use a copy of cookie->domain
+ as the key for the life-time of the chain. Using
+ cookie->domain would be unsafe because the life-time of the
+ chain may exceed the life-time of the cookie. (Cookies may
+ be deleted from the chain by this very function.) */
+ cookie->next = NULL;
+ chain_key = xstrdup (cookie->domain);
+ }
+
+ hash_table_put (jar->chains, chain_key, cookie);
+ ++jar->cookie_count;
+
+ IF_DEBUG
+ {
+ time_t exptime = cookie->expiry_time;
+ DEBUGP (("\nStored cookie %s %d%s %s <%s> <%s> [expiry %s] %s %s\n",
+ cookie->domain, cookie->port,
+ cookie->port == PORT_ANY ? " (ANY)" : "",
+ cookie->path,
+ cookie->permanent ? "permanent" : "session",
+ cookie->secure ? "secure" : "insecure",
+ cookie->expiry_time ? datetime_str (exptime) : "none",
+ cookie->attr, cookie->value));
+ }
+}
+
+/* Discard a cookie matching COOKIE's domain, port, path, and
+ attribute name. This gets called when we encounter a cookie whose
+ expiry date is in the past, or whose max-age is set to 0. The
+ former corresponds to netscape cookie spec, while the latter is
+ specified by rfc2109. */
+
+static void
+discard_matching_cookie (struct cookie_jar *jar, struct cookie *cookie)
+{
+ struct cookie *prev, *victim;
+
+ if (!hash_table_count (jar->chains))
+ /* No elements == nothing to discard. */
+ return;
+
+ victim = find_matching_cookie (jar, cookie, &prev);
+ if (victim)
+ {
+ if (prev)
+ /* Simply unchain the victim. */
+ prev->next = victim->next;
+ else
+ {
+ /* VICTIM was head of its chain. We need to place a new
+ cookie at the head. */
+ char *chain_key = NULL;
+ int res;
+
+ res = hash_table_get_pair (jar->chains, victim->domain,
+ &chain_key, NULL);
+
+ if (res == 0)
+ {
+ logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Unable to get cookie for %s\n"),
+ victim->domain);
+ }
+ if (!victim->next)
+ {
+ /* VICTIM was the only cookie in the chain. Destroy the
+ chain and deallocate the chain key. */
+ hash_table_remove (jar->chains, victim->domain);
+ xfree (chain_key);
+ }
+ else
+ hash_table_put (jar->chains, chain_key, victim->next);
+ }
+ delete_cookie (victim);
+ DEBUGP (("Discarded old cookie.\n"));
+ }
+}
+
+/* Functions for parsing the `Set-Cookie' header, and creating new
+ cookies from the wire. */
+
+#define TOKEN_IS(token, string_literal) \
+ BOUNDED_EQUAL_NO_CASE (token.b, token.e, string_literal)
+
+#define TOKEN_NON_EMPTY(token) (token.b != NULL && token.b != token.e)
+
+/* Parse the contents of the `Set-Cookie' header. The header looks
+ like this:
+
+ name1=value1; name2=value2; ...
+
+ Trailing semicolon is optional; spaces are allowed between all
+ tokens. Additionally, values may be quoted.
+
+ A new cookie is returned upon success, NULL otherwise.
+
+ The first name-value pair will be used to set the cookie's
+ attribute name and value. Subsequent parameters will be checked
+ against field names such as `domain', `path', etc. Recognized
+ fields will be parsed and the corresponding members of COOKIE
+ filled. */
+
+static struct cookie *
+parse_set_cookie (const char *set_cookie, bool silent)
+{
+ const char *ptr = set_cookie;
+ struct cookie *cookie = cookie_new ();
+ param_token name, value;
+
+ if (!extract_param (&ptr, &name, &value, ';', NULL))
+ goto error;
+ if (!value.b)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* If the value is quoted, do not modify it. */
+ if (*(value.b - 1) == '"')
+ value.b--;
+ if (*value.e == '"')
+ value.e++;
+
+ cookie->attr = strdupdelim (name.b, name.e);
+ cookie->value = strdupdelim (value.b, value.e);
+
+ while (extract_param (&ptr, &name, &value, ';', NULL))
+ {
+ if (TOKEN_IS (name, "domain"))
+ {
+ if (!TOKEN_NON_EMPTY (value))
+ goto error;
+ xfree (cookie->domain);
+ /* Strictly speaking, we should set cookie->domain_exact if the
+ domain doesn't begin with a dot. But many sites set the
+ domain to "foo.com" and expect "subhost.foo.com" to get the
+ cookie, and it apparently works in browsers. */
+ if (*value.b == '.')
+ ++value.b;
+ cookie->domain = strdupdelim (value.b, value.e);
+ }
+ else if (TOKEN_IS (name, "path"))
+ {
+ if (!TOKEN_NON_EMPTY (value))
+ goto error;
+ xfree (cookie->path);
+ cookie->path = strdupdelim (value.b, value.e);
+ }
+ else if (TOKEN_IS (name, "expires"))
+ {
+ char value_copy[128];
+ size_t value_len = value.e - value.b;
+ time_t expires;
+
+ if (!TOKEN_NON_EMPTY (value) || value_len >= sizeof (value_copy))
+ goto error;
+
+ memcpy (value_copy, value.b, value_len);
+ value_copy[value_len] = 0;
+
+ /* Check if expiration spec is valid.
+ If not, assume default (cookie doesn't expire, but valid only for
+ this session.) */
+ expires = http_atotm (value_copy);
+ if (expires != (time_t) -1)
+ {
+ cookie->permanent = 1;
+ cookie->expiry_time = expires;
+ /* According to netscape's specification, expiry time in
+ the past means that discarding of a matching cookie
+ is requested. */
+ if (cookie->expiry_time < cookies_now)
+ cookie->discard_requested = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (TOKEN_IS (name, "max-age"))
+ {
+ double maxage = -1;
+ char value_copy[32];
+ size_t value_len = value.e - value.b;
+
+ if (!TOKEN_NON_EMPTY (value) || value_len >= sizeof (value_copy))
+ goto error;
+
+ memcpy (value_copy, value.b, value_len);
+ value_copy[value_len] = 0;
+
+ sscanf (value_copy, "%lf", &maxage);
+ if (maxage == -1)
+ /* something went wrong. */
+ goto error;
+ cookie->permanent = 1;
+ cookie->expiry_time = cookies_now + (time_t) maxage;
+
+ /* According to rfc2109, a cookie with max-age of 0 means that
+ discarding of a matching cookie is requested. */
+ if (maxage == 0)
+ cookie->discard_requested = 1;
+ }
+ else if (TOKEN_IS (name, "secure"))
+ {
+ /* ignore value completely */
+ cookie->secure = 1;
+ }
+ /* else: Ignore unrecognized attribute. */
+ }
+ if (*ptr)
+ /* extract_param has encountered a syntax error */
+ goto error;
+
+ /* The cookie has been successfully constructed; return it. */
+ return cookie;
+
+ error:
+ if (!silent)
+ logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
+ _("Syntax error in Set-Cookie: %s at position %d.\n"),
+ quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, set_cookie),
+ (int) (ptr - set_cookie));
+ delete_cookie (cookie);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#undef TOKEN_IS
+#undef TOKEN_NON_EMPTY
+
+/* Sanity checks. These are important, otherwise it is possible for
+ mailcious attackers to destroy important cookie information and/or
+ violate your privacy. */
+
+
+#define REQUIRE_DIGITS(p) do { \
+ if (!c_isdigit (*p)) \
+ return false; \
+ for (++p; c_isdigit (*p); p++) \
+ ; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define REQUIRE_DOT(p) do { \
+ if (*p++ != '.') \
+ return false; \
+} while (0)
+
+/* Check whether ADDR matches <digits>.<digits>.<digits>.<digits>.
+
+ We don't want to call network functions like inet_addr() because
+ all we need is a check, preferably one that is small, fast, and
+ well-defined. */
+
+static bool
+numeric_address_p (const char *addr)
+{
+ const char *p = addr;
+
+ REQUIRE_DIGITS (p); /* A */
+ REQUIRE_DOT (p); /* . */
+ REQUIRE_DIGITS (p); /* B */
+ REQUIRE_DOT (p); /* . */
+ REQUIRE_DIGITS (p); /* C */
+ REQUIRE_DOT (p); /* . */
+ REQUIRE_DIGITS (p); /* D */
+
+ if (*p != '\0')
+ return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
+/* Check whether COOKIE_DOMAIN is an appropriate domain for HOST.
+ Originally I tried to make the check compliant with rfc2109, but
+ the sites deviated too often, so I had to fall back to "tail
+ matching", as defined by the original Netscape's cookie spec.
+
+ Wget now uses libpsl to check domain names against a public suffix
+ list to see if they are valid. However, since we don't provide a
+ psl on our own, if libpsl is compiled without a public suffix list,
+ fall back to using the original "tail matching" heuristic. Also if
+ libpsl is unable to convert the domain to lowercase, which means that
+ it doesn't have any runtime conversion support, we again fall back to
+ "tail matching" since libpsl states the results are unpredictable with
+ upper case strings.
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBPSL
+static psl_ctx_t *psl;
+#endif
+
+static bool
+check_domain_match (const char *cookie_domain, const char *host)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBPSL
+ static int init_psl;
+ char *cookie_domain_lower = NULL;
+ char *host_lower = NULL;
+ int is_acceptable;
+
+ DEBUGP (("cdm: 1\n"));
+ if (!init_psl)
+ {
+ init_psl = 1;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PSL_LATEST
+ if ((psl = psl_latest (NULL)))
+ goto have_psl;
+
+ DEBUGP (("\nPSL: Failed to load any PSL data. "
+ "Falling back to insecure heuristics.\n"));
+#else
+ if ((psl = psl_builtin ()) && !psl_builtin_outdated ())
+ goto have_psl;
+
+ DEBUGP (("\nPSL: built-in data outdated. "
+ "Trying to load data from %s.\n",
+ quote (psl_builtin_filename ())));
+
+ if ((psl = psl_load_file (psl_builtin_filename ())))
+ goto have_psl;
+
+ DEBUGP (("\nPSL: %s not found or not readable. "
+ "Falling back to built-in data.\n",
+ quote (psl_builtin_filename ())));
+
+ if (!(psl = psl_builtin ()))
+ {
+ DEBUGP (("\nPSL: libpsl not built with a public suffix list. "
+ "Falling back to insecure heuristics.\n"));
+ goto no_psl;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ else if (!psl)
+ goto no_psl;
+
+have_psl:
+ if (psl_str_to_utf8lower (cookie_domain, NULL, NULL, &cookie_domain_lower) == PSL_SUCCESS &&
+ psl_str_to_utf8lower (host, NULL, NULL, &host_lower) == PSL_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ is_acceptable = psl_is_cookie_domain_acceptable (psl, host_lower, cookie_domain_lower);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ DEBUGP (("libpsl unable to parse domain name. "
+ "Falling back to simple heuristics.\n"));
+ goto no_psl;
+ }
+
+ xfree (cookie_domain_lower);
+ xfree (host_lower);
+
+ return is_acceptable == 1;
+
+no_psl:
+ /* Cleanup the PSL pointers first */
+ xfree (cookie_domain_lower);
+ xfree (host_lower);
+#endif
+
+ /* For efficiency make some elementary checks first */
+ DEBUGP (("cdm: 2\n"));
+
+ /* For the sake of efficiency, check for exact match first. */
+ if (0 == strcasecmp (cookie_domain, host))
+ return true;
+
+ DEBUGP (("cdm: 3\n"));
+
+ /* HOST must match the tail of cookie_domain. */
+ if (!match_tail (host, cookie_domain, true))
+ return false;
+
+ /* We know that COOKIE_DOMAIN is a subset of HOST; however, we must
+ make sure that somebody is not trying to set the cookie for a
+ subdomain shared by many entities. For example, "company.co.uk"
+ must not be allowed to set a cookie for ".co.uk". On the other
+ hand, "sso.redhat.de" should be able to set a cookie for
+ ".redhat.de".
+
+ The only marginally sane way to handle this I can think of is to
+ reject on the basis of the length of the second-level domain name
+ (but when the top-level domain is unknown), with the assumption
+ that those of three or less characters could be reserved. For
+ example:
+
+ .co.org -> works because the TLD is known
+ .co.uk -> doesn't work because "co" is only two chars long
+ .com.au -> doesn't work because "com" is only 3 chars long
+ .cnn.uk -> doesn't work because "cnn" is also only 3 chars long (ugh)
+ .cnn.de -> doesn't work for the same reason (ugh!!)
+ .abcd.de -> works because "abcd" is 4 chars long
+ .img.cnn.de -> works because it's not trying to set the 2nd level domain
+ .cnn.co.uk -> works for the same reason
+
+ That should prevent misuse, while allowing reasonable usage. If
+ someone knows of a better way to handle this, please let me
+ know. */
+ {
+ const char *p = cookie_domain;
+ int dccount = 1; /* number of domain components */
+ int ldcl = 0; /* last domain component length */
+ int nldcl = 0; /* next to last domain component length */
+ int out;
+ if (*p == '.')
+ /* Ignore leading period in this calculation. */
+ ++p;
+ DEBUGP (("cdm: 4\n"));
+ for (out = 0; !out; p++)
+ switch (*p)
+ {
+ case '\0':
+ out = 1;
+ break;
+ case '.':
+ if (ldcl == 0)
+ /* Empty domain component found -- the domain is invalid. */
+ return false;
+ if (*(p + 1) == '\0')
+ {
+ /* Tolerate trailing '.' by not treating the domain as
+ one ending with an empty domain component. */
+ out = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ nldcl = ldcl;
+ ldcl = 0;
+ ++dccount;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ++ldcl;
+ }
+
+ DEBUGP (("cdm: 5\n"));
+
+ if (dccount < 2)
+ return false;
+
+ DEBUGP (("cdm: 6\n"));
+
+ if (dccount == 2)
+ {
+ size_t i;
+ int known_toplevel = false;
+ static const char *known_toplevel_domains[] = {
+ ".com", ".edu", ".net", ".org", ".gov", ".mil", ".int"
+ };
+ for (i = 0; i < countof (known_toplevel_domains); i++)
+ if (match_tail (cookie_domain, known_toplevel_domains[i], true))
+ {
+ known_toplevel = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!known_toplevel && nldcl <= 3)
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ DEBUGP (("cdm: 7\n"));
+
+ /* Don't allow the host "foobar.com" to set a cookie for domain
+ "bar.com". */
+ if (*cookie_domain != '.')
+ {
+ int dlen = strlen (cookie_domain);
+ int hlen = strlen (host);
+ /* cookie host: hostname.foobar.com */
+ /* desired domain: bar.com */
+ /* '.' must be here in host-> ^ */
+ if (hlen > dlen && host[hlen - dlen - 1] != '.')
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ DEBUGP (("cdm: 8\n"));
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static int path_matches (const char *, const char *);
+
+/* Check whether PATH begins with COOKIE_PATH. */
+
+static bool
+check_path_match (const char *cookie_path, const char *path)
+{
+ return path_matches (path, cookie_path) != 0;
+}
+
+/* Process the HTTP `Set-Cookie' header. This results in storing the
+ cookie or discarding a matching one, or ignoring it completely, all
+ depending on the contents. */
+
+void
+cookie_handle_set_cookie (struct cookie_jar *jar,
+ const char *host, int port,
+ const char *path, const char *set_cookie)
+{
+ struct cookie *cookie;
+ cookies_now = time (NULL);
+ char buf[1024], *tmp;
+ size_t pathlen = strlen(path);
+
+ /* Wget's paths don't begin with '/' (blame rfc1808), but cookie
+ usage assumes /-prefixed paths. Until the rest of Wget is fixed,
+ simply prepend slash to PATH. */
+ if (pathlen < sizeof (buf) - 1)
+ tmp = buf;
+ else
+ tmp = xmalloc (pathlen + 2);
+
+ *tmp = '/';
+ memcpy (tmp + 1, path, pathlen + 1);
+ path = tmp;
+
+ cookie = parse_set_cookie (set_cookie, false);
+ if (!cookie)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Sanitize parts of cookie. */
+
+ if (!cookie->domain)
+ {
+ cookie->domain = xstrdup (host);
+ cookie->domain_exact = 1;
+ /* Set the port, but only if it's non-default. */
+ if (port != 80 && port != 443)
+ cookie->port = port;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!check_domain_match (cookie->domain, host))
+ {
+ logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
+ _("Cookie coming from %s attempted to set domain to "),
+ quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, host));
+ logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
+ _("%s\n"),
+ quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, cookie->domain));
+ cookie->discard_requested = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!cookie->path)
+ {
+ /* The cookie doesn't set path: set it to the URL path, sans the
+ file part ("/dir/file" truncated to "/dir/"). */
+ char *trailing_slash = strrchr (path, '/');
+ if (trailing_slash)
+ cookie->path = strdupdelim (path, trailing_slash + 1);
+ else
+ /* no slash in the string -- can this even happen? */
+ cookie->path = xstrdup (path);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* The cookie sets its own path; verify that it is legal. */
+ if (!check_path_match (cookie->path, path))
+ {
+ DEBUGP (("Attempt to fake the path: %s, %s\n",
+ cookie->path, path));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Now store the cookie, or discard an existing cookie, if
+ discarding was requested. */
+
+ if (cookie->discard_requested)
+ {
+ discard_matching_cookie (jar, cookie);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ store_cookie (jar, cookie);
+ if (tmp != buf)
+ xfree (tmp);
+ return;
+
+ out:
+ if (cookie)
+ delete_cookie (cookie);
+ if (tmp != buf)
+ xfree (tmp);
+}
+
+/* Support for sending out cookies in HTTP requests, based on
+ previously stored cookies. Entry point is
+ `build_cookies_request'. */
+
+/* Return a count of how many times CHR occurs in STRING. */
+
+static int
+count_char (const char *string, char chr)
+{
+ const char *p;
+ int count = 0;
+ for (p = string; *p; p++)
+ if (*p == chr)
+ ++count;
+ return count;
+}
+
+/* Find the cookie chains whose domains match HOST and store them to
+ DEST.
+
+ A cookie chain is the head of a list of cookies that belong to a
+ host/domain. Given HOST "img.search.xemacs.org", this function
+ will return the chains for "img.search.xemacs.org",
+ "search.xemacs.org", and "xemacs.org" -- those of them that exist
+ (if any), that is.
+
+ DEST should be large enough to accept (in the worst case) as many
+ elements as there are domain components of HOST. */
+
+static int
+find_chains_of_host (struct cookie_jar *jar, const char *host,
+ struct cookie *dest[])
+{
+ int dest_count = 0;
+ int passes, passcnt;
+
+ /* Bail out quickly if there are no cookies in the jar. */
+ if (!hash_table_count (jar->chains))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (numeric_address_p (host))
+ /* If host is an IP address, only check for the exact match. */
+ passes = 1;
+ else
+ /* Otherwise, check all the subdomains except the top-level (last)
+ one. As a domain with N components has N-1 dots, the number of
+ passes equals the number of dots. */
+ passes = count_char (host, '.');
+
+ passcnt = 0;
+
+ /* Find chains that match HOST, starting with exact match and
+ progressing to less specific domains. For instance, given HOST
+ fly.srk.fer.hr, first look for fly.srk.fer.hr's chain, then
+ srk.fer.hr's, then fer.hr's. */
+ while (1)
+ {
+ struct cookie *chain = hash_table_get (jar->chains, host);
+ if (chain)
+ dest[dest_count++] = chain;
+ if (++passcnt >= passes)
+ break;
+ host = strchr (host, '.') + 1;
+ }
+
+ return dest_count;
+}
+
+/* If FULL_PATH begins with PREFIX, return the length of PREFIX, zero
+ otherwise. */
+
+static int
+path_matches (const char *full_path, const char *prefix)
+{
+ int len = strlen (prefix);
+
+ if (0 != strncmp (full_path, prefix, len))
+ /* FULL_PATH doesn't begin with PREFIX. */
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Length of PREFIX determines the quality of the match. */
+ return len + 1;
+}
+
+/* Return true if COOKIE matches the provided parameters of the URL
+ being downloaded: HOST, PORT, PATH, and SECFLAG.
+
+ If PATH_GOODNESS is non-NULL, store the "path goodness" value
+ there. That value is a measure of how closely COOKIE matches PATH,
+ used for ordering cookies. */
+
+static bool
+cookie_matches_url (const struct cookie *cookie,
+ const char *host, int port, const char *path,
+ bool secflag, int *path_goodness)
+{
+ int pg;
+
+ if (cookie_expired_p (cookie))
+ /* Ignore stale cookies. Don't bother unchaining the cookie at
+ this point -- Wget is a relatively short-lived application, and
+ stale cookies will not be saved by `save_cookies'. On the
+ other hand, this function should be as efficient as
+ possible. */
+ return false;
+
+ if (cookie->secure && !secflag)
+ /* Don't transmit secure cookies over insecure connections. */
+ return false;
+ if (cookie->port != PORT_ANY && cookie->port != port)
+ return false;
+
+ /* If exact domain match is required, verify that cookie's domain is
+ equal to HOST. If not, assume success on the grounds of the
+ cookie's chain having been found by find_chains_of_host. */
+ if (cookie->domain_exact
+ && 0 != strcasecmp (host, cookie->domain))
+ return false;
+
+ pg = path_matches (path, cookie->path);
+ if (pg == 0)
+ return false;
+
+ if (path_goodness)
+ /* If the caller requested path_goodness, we return it. This is
+ an optimization, so that the caller doesn't need to call
+ path_matches() again. */
+ *path_goodness = pg;
+ return true;
+}
+
+/* A structure that points to a cookie, along with the additional
+ information about the cookie's "goodness". This allows us to sort
+ the cookies when returning them to the server, as required by the
+ spec. */
+
+struct weighed_cookie {
+ struct cookie *cookie;
+ int domain_goodness;
+ int path_goodness;
+};
+
+/* Comparator used for uniquifying the list. */
+
+static int
+equality_comparator (const void *p1, const void *p2)
+{
+ struct weighed_cookie *wc1 = (struct weighed_cookie *)p1;
+ struct weighed_cookie *wc2 = (struct weighed_cookie *)p2;
+
+ int namecmp = strcmp (wc1->cookie->attr, wc2->cookie->attr);
+ int valuecmp = strcmp (wc1->cookie->value, wc2->cookie->value);
+
+ /* We only really care whether both name and value are equal. We
+ return them in this order only for consistency... */
+ return namecmp ? namecmp : valuecmp;
+}
+
+/* Eliminate duplicate cookies. "Duplicate cookies" are any two
+ cookies with the same attr name and value. Whenever a duplicate
+ pair is found, one of the cookies is removed. */
+
+static int
+eliminate_dups (struct weighed_cookie *outgoing, int count)
+{
+ struct weighed_cookie *h; /* hare */
+ struct weighed_cookie *t; /* tortoise */
+ struct weighed_cookie *end = outgoing + count;
+
+ /* We deploy a simple uniquify algorithm: first sort the array
+ according to our sort criteria, then copy it to itself, comparing
+ each cookie to its neighbor and ignoring the duplicates. */
+
+ qsort (outgoing, count, sizeof (struct weighed_cookie), equality_comparator);
+
+ /* "Hare" runs through all the entries in the array, followed by
+ "tortoise". If a duplicate is found, the hare skips it.
+ Non-duplicate entries are copied to the tortoise ptr. */
+
+ for (h = t = outgoing; h < end; h++)
+ {
+ if (h != end - 1)
+ {
+ struct cookie *c0 = h[0].cookie;
+ struct cookie *c1 = h[1].cookie;
+ if (!strcmp (c0->attr, c1->attr) && !strcmp (c0->value, c1->value))
+ continue; /* ignore the duplicate */
+ }
+
+ /* If the hare has advanced past the tortoise (because of
+ previous dups), make sure the values get copied. Otherwise,
+ no copying is necessary. */
+ if (h != t)
+ *t++ = *h;
+ else
+ t++;
+ }
+ return t - outgoing;
+}
+
+/* Comparator used for sorting by quality. */
+
+static int
+goodness_comparator (const void *p1, const void *p2)
+{
+ struct weighed_cookie *wc1 = (struct weighed_cookie *)p1;
+ struct weighed_cookie *wc2 = (struct weighed_cookie *)p2;
+
+ /* Subtractions take `wc2' as the first argument becauase we want a
+ sort in *decreasing* order of goodness. */
+ int dgdiff = wc2->domain_goodness - wc1->domain_goodness;
+ int pgdiff = wc2->path_goodness - wc1->path_goodness;
+
+ /* Sort by domain goodness; if these are the same, sort by path
+ goodness. (The sorting order isn't really specified; maybe it
+ should be the other way around.) */
+ return dgdiff ? dgdiff : pgdiff;
+}
+
+/* Generate a `Cookie' header for a request that goes to HOST:PORT and
+ requests PATH from the server. The resulting string is allocated
+ with `malloc', and the caller is responsible for freeing it. If no
+ cookies pertain to this request, i.e. no cookie header should be
+ generated, NULL is returned. */
+
+char *
+cookie_header (struct cookie_jar *jar, const char *host,
+ int port, const char *path, bool secflag)
+{
+ struct cookie *chains[32];
+ int chain_count;
+
+ struct cookie *cookie;
+ struct weighed_cookie *outgoing;
+ size_t count, i, ocnt;
+ char *result = NULL;
+ int result_size, pos;
+ char pathbuf[1024];
+
+ /* First, find the cookie chains whose domains match HOST. */
+
+ /* Allocate room for find_chains_of_host to write to. The number of
+ chains can at most equal the number of subdomains, hence
+ 1+<number of dots>. We ignore cookies with more than 32 labels. */
+ chain_count = 1 + count_char (host, '.');
+ if (chain_count > (int) countof (chains))
+ return NULL;
+ chain_count = find_chains_of_host (jar, host, chains);
+
+ /* No cookies for this host. */
+ if (chain_count <= 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Wget's paths don't begin with '/' (blame rfc1808), but cookie
+ usage assumes /-prefixed paths. Until the rest of Wget is fixed,
+ simply prepend slash to PATH. */
+ {
+ char *tmp;
+ size_t pathlen = strlen(path);
+
+ if (pathlen < sizeof (pathbuf) - 1)
+ tmp = pathbuf;
+ else
+ tmp = xmalloc (pathlen + 2);
+
+ *tmp = '/';
+ memcpy (tmp + 1, path, pathlen + 1);
+ path = tmp;
+ }
+
+ cookies_now = time (NULL);
+
+ /* Now extract from the chains those cookies that match our host
+ (for domain_exact cookies), port (for cookies with port other
+ than PORT_ANY), etc. See matching_cookie for details. */
+
+ /* Count the number of matching cookies. */
+ count = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < (unsigned) chain_count; i++)
+ for (cookie = chains[i]; cookie; cookie = cookie->next)
+ if (cookie_matches_url (cookie, host, port, path, secflag, NULL))
+ ++count;
+ if (!count)
+ goto out; /* no cookies matched */
+
+ /* Allocate the array. */
+ if (count > SIZE_MAX / sizeof (struct weighed_cookie))
+ goto out; /* unable to process so many cookies */
+ outgoing = xmalloc (count * sizeof (struct weighed_cookie));
+
+ /* Fill the array with all the matching cookies from the chains that
+ match HOST. */
+ ocnt = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < (unsigned) chain_count; i++)
+ for (cookie = chains[i]; cookie; cookie = cookie->next)
+ {
+ int pg;
+ if (!cookie_matches_url (cookie, host, port, path, secflag, &pg))
+ continue;
+ outgoing[ocnt].cookie = cookie;
+ outgoing[ocnt].domain_goodness = strlen (cookie->domain);
+ outgoing[ocnt].path_goodness = pg;
+ ++ocnt;
+ }
+ assert (ocnt == count);
+
+ /* Eliminate duplicate cookies; that is, those whose name and value
+ are the same. */
+ count = eliminate_dups (outgoing, count);
+
+ /* Sort the array so that best-matching domains come first, and
+ that, within one domain, best-matching paths come first. */
+ qsort (outgoing, count, sizeof (struct weighed_cookie), goodness_comparator);
+
+ /* Count the space the name=value pairs will take. */
+ result_size = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+ {
+ struct cookie *c = outgoing[i].cookie;
+ /* name=value */
+ result_size += strlen (c->attr) + 1 + strlen (c->value);
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate output buffer:
+ name=value pairs -- result_size
+ "; " separators -- (count - 1) * 2
+ \0 terminator -- 1 */
+ result_size = result_size + (count - 1) * 2 + 1;
+ result = xmalloc (result_size);
+ pos = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+ {
+ struct cookie *c = outgoing[i].cookie;
+ int namlen = strlen (c->attr);
+ int vallen = strlen (c->value);
+
+ memcpy (result + pos, c->attr, namlen);
+ pos += namlen;
+ result[pos++] = '=';
+ memcpy (result + pos, c->value, vallen);
+ pos += vallen;
+ if (i < count - 1)
+ {
+ result[pos++] = ';';
+ result[pos++] = ' ';
+ }
+ }
+ result[pos++] = '\0';
+ xfree (outgoing);
+ assert (pos == result_size);
+
+out:
+ if (path != pathbuf)
+ xfree (path);
+
+return result;
+}
+
+/* Support for loading and saving cookies. The format used for
+ loading and saving should be the format of the `cookies.txt' file
+ used by Netscape and Mozilla, at least the Unix versions.
+ (Apparently IE can export cookies in that format as well.) The
+ format goes like this:
+
+ DOMAIN DOMAIN-FLAG PATH SECURE-FLAG TIMESTAMP ATTR-NAME ATTR-VALUE
+
+ DOMAIN -- cookie domain, optionally followed by :PORT
+ DOMAIN-FLAG -- whether all hosts in the domain match
+ PATH -- cookie path
+ SECURE-FLAG -- whether cookie requires secure connection
+ TIMESTAMP -- expiry timestamp, number of seconds since epoch
+ ATTR-NAME -- name of the cookie attribute
+ ATTR-VALUE -- value of the cookie attribute (empty if absent)
+
+ The fields are separated by TABs. All fields are mandatory, except
+ for ATTR-VALUE. The `-FLAG' fields are boolean, their legal values
+ being "TRUE" and "FALSE'. Empty lines, lines consisting of
+ whitespace only, and comment lines (beginning with # optionally
+ preceded by whitespace) are ignored.
+
+ Example line from cookies.txt (split in two lines for readability):
+
+ .google.com TRUE / FALSE 2147368447 \
+ PREF ID=34bb47565bbcd47b:LD=en:NR=20:TM=985172580:LM=985739012
+
+*/
+
+/* If the region [B, E) ends with :<digits>, parse the number, return
+ it, and store new boundary (location of the `:') to DOMAIN_E_PTR.
+ If port is not specified, return 0. */
+
+static int
+domain_port (const char *domain_b, const char *domain_e,
+ const char **domain_e_ptr)
+{
+ int port = 0;
+ const char *p;
+ const char *colon = memchr (domain_b, ':', domain_e - domain_b);
+ if (!colon)
+ return 0;
+ for (p = colon + 1; p < domain_e && c_isdigit (*p); p++)
+ port = 10 * port + (*p - '0');
+ if (p < domain_e)
+ /* Garbage following port number. */
+ return 0;
+ *domain_e_ptr = colon;
+ return port;
+}
+
+#define GET_WORD(p, b, e) do { \
+ b = p; \
+ while (*p && *p != '\t') \
+ ++p; \
+ e = p; \
+ if (b == e || !*p) \
+ goto next; \
+ ++p; \
+} while (0)
+
+/* Load cookies from FILE. */
+
+void
+cookie_jar_load (struct cookie_jar *jar, const char *file)
+{
+ char *line = NULL;
+ size_t bufsize = 0;
+
+ FILE *fp = fopen (file, "r");
+ if (!fp)
+ {
+ logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Cannot open cookies file %s: %s\n"),
+ quote (file), strerror (errno));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ cookies_now = time (NULL);
+
+ while (getline (&line, &bufsize, fp) > 0)
+ {
+ struct cookie *cookie;
+ char *p = line;
+
+ double expiry;
+ int port;
+
+ char *domain_b = NULL, *domain_e = NULL;
+ char *domflag_b = NULL, *domflag_e = NULL;
+ char *path_b = NULL, *path_e = NULL;
+ char *secure_b = NULL, *secure_e = NULL;
+ char *expires_b = NULL, *expires_e = NULL;
+ char *name_b = NULL, *name_e = NULL;
+ char *value_b = NULL, *value_e = NULL;
+
+ /* Skip leading white-space. */
+ while (*p && c_isspace (*p))
+ ++p;
+ /* Ignore empty lines. */
+ if (!*p || *p == '#')
+ continue;
+
+ GET_WORD (p, domain_b, domain_e);
+ GET_WORD (p, domflag_b, domflag_e);
+ GET_WORD (p, path_b, path_e);
+ GET_WORD (p, secure_b, secure_e);
+ GET_WORD (p, expires_b, expires_e);
+ GET_WORD (p, name_b, name_e);
+
+ /* Don't use GET_WORD for value because it ends with newline,
+ not TAB. */
+ value_b = p;
+ value_e = p + strlen (p);
+ if (value_e > value_b && value_e[-1] == '\n')
+ --value_e;
+ if (value_e > value_b && value_e[-1] == '\r')
+ --value_e;
+ /* Empty values are legal (I think), so don't bother checking. */
+
+ cookie = cookie_new ();
+
+ cookie->attr = strdupdelim (name_b, name_e);
+ cookie->value = strdupdelim (value_b, value_e);
+ cookie->path = strdupdelim (path_b, path_e);
+ cookie->secure = BOUNDED_EQUAL (secure_b, secure_e, "TRUE");
+
+ /* Curl source says, quoting Andre Garcia: "flag: A TRUE/FALSE
+ value indicating if all machines within a given domain can
+ access the variable. This value is set automatically by the
+ browser, depending on the value set for the domain." */
+ cookie->domain_exact = !BOUNDED_EQUAL (domflag_b, domflag_e, "TRUE");
+
+ /* DOMAIN needs special treatment because we might need to
+ extract the port. */
+ port = domain_port (domain_b, domain_e, (const char **)&domain_e);
+ if (port)
+ cookie->port = port;
+
+ if (*domain_b == '.')
+ ++domain_b; /* remove leading dot internally */
+ cookie->domain = strdupdelim (domain_b, domain_e);
+
+ /* safe default in case EXPIRES field is garbled. */
+ expiry = (double)cookies_now - 1;
+
+ /* I don't like changing the line, but it's safe here. (line is
+ malloced.) */
+ *expires_e = '\0';
+ sscanf (expires_b, "%lf", &expiry);
+
+ if (expiry == 0)
+ {
+ /* EXPIRY can be 0 for session cookies saved because the
+ user specified `--keep-session-cookies' in the past.
+ They remain session cookies, and will be saved only if
+ the user has specified `keep-session-cookies' again. */
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (expiry < cookies_now)
+ goto abort_cookie; /* ignore stale cookie. */
+ cookie->expiry_time = (time_t) expiry;
+ cookie->permanent = 1;
+ }
+
+ store_cookie (jar, cookie);
+
+ next:
+ continue;
+
+ abort_cookie:
+ delete_cookie (cookie);
+ }
+
+ xfree(line);
+ fclose (fp);
+}
+
+/* Save cookies, in format described above, to FILE. */
+
+void
+cookie_jar_save (struct cookie_jar *jar, const char *file)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ hash_table_iterator iter;
+
+ DEBUGP (("Saving cookies to %s.\n", file));
+
+ cookies_now = time (NULL);
+
+ fp = fopen (file, "w");
+ if (!fp)
+ {
+ logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Cannot open cookies file %s: %s\n"),
+ quote (file), strerror (errno));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ fputs ("# HTTP Cookie File\n", fp);
+ fprintf (fp, "# Generated by Wget on %s.\n", datetime_str (cookies_now));
+ fputs ("# Edit at your own risk.\n\n", fp);
+
+ for (hash_table_iterate (jar->chains, &iter);
+ hash_table_iter_next (&iter);
+ )
+ {
+ const char *domain = iter.key;
+ struct cookie *cookie = iter.value;
+ for (; cookie; cookie = cookie->next)
+ {
+ if (!cookie->permanent && !opt.keep_session_cookies)
+ continue;
+ if (cookie_expired_p (cookie))
+ continue;
+ if (!cookie->domain_exact)
+ fputc ('.', fp);
+ fputs (domain, fp);
+ if (cookie->port != PORT_ANY)
+ fprintf (fp, ":%d", cookie->port);
+ fprintf (fp, "\t%s\t%s\t%s\t%.0f\t%s\t%s\n",
+ cookie->domain_exact ? "FALSE" : "TRUE",
+ cookie->path, cookie->secure ? "TRUE" : "FALSE",
+ (double)cookie->expiry_time,
+ cookie->attr, cookie->value);
+ if (ferror (fp))
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ out:
+ if (ferror (fp))
+ logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Error writing to %s: %s\n"),
+ quote (file), strerror (errno));
+ if (fclose (fp) < 0)
+ logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Error closing %s: %s\n"),
+ quote (file), strerror (errno));
+
+ DEBUGP (("Done saving cookies.\n"));
+}
+
+/* Clean up cookie-related data. */
+
+void
+cookie_jar_delete (struct cookie_jar *jar)
+{
+ /* Iterate over chains (indexed by domain) and free them. */
+ hash_table_iterator iter;
+ for (hash_table_iterate (jar->chains, &iter); hash_table_iter_next (&iter); )
+ {
+ struct cookie *chain = iter.value;
+ xfree (iter.key);
+ /* Then all cookies in this chain. */
+ while (chain)
+ {
+ struct cookie *next = chain->next;
+ delete_cookie (chain);
+ chain = next;
+ }
+ }
+ hash_table_destroy (jar->chains);
+ xfree (jar);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBPSL
+ psl_free (psl);
+ psl = NULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Test cases. Currently this is only tests parse_set_cookies. To
+ use, recompile Wget with -DTEST_COOKIES and call test_cookies()
+ from main. */
+
+#ifdef TEST_COOKIES
+void
+test_cookies (void)
+{
+ /* Tests expected to succeed: */
+ static struct {
+ const char *data;
+ const char *results[10];
+ } tests_succ[] = {
+ { "arg=value", {"arg", "value", NULL} },
+ { "arg1=value1;arg2=value2", {"arg1", "value1", "arg2", "value2", NULL} },
+ { "arg1=value1; arg2=value2", {"arg1", "value1", "arg2", "value2", NULL} },
+ { "arg1=value1; arg2=value2;", {"arg1", "value1", "arg2", "value2", NULL} },
+ { "arg1=value1; arg2=value2; ", {"arg1", "value1", "arg2", "value2", NULL} },
+ { "arg1=\"value1\"; arg2=\"\"", {"arg1", "value1", "arg2", "", NULL} },
+ { "arg=", {"arg", "", NULL} },
+ { "arg1=; arg2=", {"arg1", "", "arg2", "", NULL} },
+ { "arg1 = ; arg2= ", {"arg1", "", "arg2", "", NULL} },
+ };
+
+ /* Tests expected to fail: */
+ static char *tests_fail[] = {
+ ";",
+ "arg=\"unterminated",
+ "=empty-name",
+ "arg1=;=another-empty-name",
+ };
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < countof (tests_succ); i++)
+ {
+ int ind;
+ const char *data = tests_succ[i].data;
+ const char **expected = tests_succ[i].results;
+ struct cookie *c;
+
+ c = parse_set_cookie (data, true);
+ if (!c)
+ {
+ printf ("NULL cookie returned for valid data: %s\n", data);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Test whether extract_param handles these cases correctly. */
+ {
+ param_token name, value;
+ const char *ptr = data;
+ int j = 0;
+ while (extract_param (&ptr, &name, &value, ';', NULL))
+ {
+ char *n = strdupdelim (name.b, name.e);
+ char *v = strdupdelim (value.b, value.e);
+ if (!expected[j])
+ {
+ printf ("Too many parameters for '%s'\n", data);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (0 != strcmp (expected[j], n))
+ printf ("Invalid name %d for '%s' (expected '%s', got '%s')\n",
+ j / 2 + 1, data, expected[j], n);
+ if (0 != strcmp (expected[j + 1], v))
+ printf ("Invalid value %d for '%s' (expected '%s', got '%s')\n",
+ j / 2 + 1, data, expected[j + 1], v);
+ j += 2;
+ xfree (n);
+ xfree (v);
+ }
+ if (expected[j])
+ printf ("Too few parameters for '%s'\n", data);
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < countof (tests_fail); i++)
+ {
+ struct cookie *c;
+ char *data = tests_fail[i];
+ c = parse_set_cookie (data, true);
+ if (c)
+ printf ("Failed to report error on invalid data: %s\n", data);
+ }
+}
+#endif /* TEST_COOKIES */