diff options
author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-10-11 10:27:00 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-10-11 10:27:00 +0000 |
commit | 65aa53fc52ff15efe54df4147564828d535837f8 (patch) | |
tree | 31c51dad04fdcca80e6d3043c8bd49d2f1a51f83 /modules/util/sanitize.go | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | forgejo-65aa53fc52ff15efe54df4147564828d535837f8.tar.xz forgejo-65aa53fc52ff15efe54df4147564828d535837f8.zip |
Adding upstream version 8.0.3.HEADupstream/8.0.3upstreamdebian
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'modules/util/sanitize.go')
-rw-r--r-- | modules/util/sanitize.go | 72 |
1 files changed, 72 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/modules/util/sanitize.go b/modules/util/sanitize.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0dd8b342 --- /dev/null +++ b/modules/util/sanitize.go @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +// Copyright 2021 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved. +// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT + +package util + +import ( + "bytes" + "unicode" +) + +type sanitizedError struct { + err error +} + +func (err sanitizedError) Error() string { + return SanitizeCredentialURLs(err.err.Error()) +} + +func (err sanitizedError) Unwrap() error { + return err.err +} + +// SanitizeErrorCredentialURLs wraps the error and make sure the returned error message doesn't contain sensitive credentials in URLs +func SanitizeErrorCredentialURLs(err error) error { + return sanitizedError{err: err} +} + +const userPlaceholder = "sanitized-credential" + +var schemeSep = []byte("://") + +// SanitizeCredentialURLs remove all credentials in URLs (starting with "scheme://") for the input string: "https://user:pass@domain.com" => "https://sanitized-credential@domain.com" +func SanitizeCredentialURLs(s string) string { + bs := UnsafeStringToBytes(s) + schemeSepPos := bytes.Index(bs, schemeSep) + if schemeSepPos == -1 || bytes.IndexByte(bs[schemeSepPos:], '@') == -1 { + return s // fast return if there is no URL scheme or no userinfo + } + out := make([]byte, 0, len(bs)+len(userPlaceholder)) + for schemeSepPos != -1 { + schemeSepPos += 3 // skip the "://" + sepAtPos := -1 // the possible '@' position: "https://foo@[^here]host" + sepEndPos := schemeSepPos // the possible end position: "The https://host[^here] in log for test" + sepLoop: + for ; sepEndPos < len(bs); sepEndPos++ { + c := bs[sepEndPos] + if ('A' <= c && c <= 'Z') || ('a' <= c && c <= 'z') || ('0' <= c && c <= '9') { + continue + } + switch c { + case '@': + sepAtPos = sepEndPos + case '-', '.', '_', '~', '!', '$', '&', '\'', '(', ')', '*', '+', ',', ';', '=', ':', '%': + continue // due to RFC 3986, userinfo can contain - . _ ~ ! $ & ' ( ) * + , ; = : and any percent-encoded chars + default: + break sepLoop // if it is an invalid char for URL (eg: space, '/', and others), stop the loop + } + } + // if there is '@', and the string is like "s://u@h", then hide the "u" part + if sepAtPos != -1 && (schemeSepPos >= 4 && unicode.IsLetter(rune(bs[schemeSepPos-4]))) && sepAtPos-schemeSepPos > 0 && sepEndPos-sepAtPos > 0 { + out = append(out, bs[:schemeSepPos]...) + out = append(out, userPlaceholder...) + out = append(out, bs[sepAtPos:sepEndPos]...) + } else { + out = append(out, bs[:sepEndPos]...) + } + bs = bs[sepEndPos:] + schemeSepPos = bytes.Index(bs, schemeSep) + } + out = append(out, bs...) + return UnsafeBytesToString(out) +} |