Adding upstream version 6.6.15.upstream/6.6.15

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 334 insertions, 0 deletions

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+===============================
+Documentation for /proc/sys/fs/
+===============================
+
+Copyright (c) 1998, 1999,  Rik van Riel <riel@nl.linux.org>
+
+Copyright (c) 2009,        Shen Feng<shen@cn.fujitsu.com>
+
+For general info and legal blurb, please look in intro.rst.
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+This file contains documentation for the sysctl files and directories
+in ``/proc/sys/fs/``.
+
+The files in this directory can be used to tune and monitor
+miscellaneous and general things in the operation of the Linux
+kernel. Since some of the files *can* be used to screw up your
+system, it is advisable to read both documentation and source
+before actually making adjustments.
+
+1. /proc/sys/fs
+===============
+
+Currently, these files might (depending on your configuration)
+show up in ``/proc/sys/fs``:
+
+.. contents:: :local:
+
+
+aio-nr & aio-max-nr
+-------------------
+
+``aio-nr`` shows the current system-wide number of asynchronous io
+requests.  ``aio-max-nr`` allows you to change the maximum value
+``aio-nr`` can grow to.  If ``aio-nr`` reaches ``aio-nr-max`` then
+``io_setup`` will fail with ``EAGAIN``.  Note that raising
+``aio-max-nr`` does not result in the
+pre-allocation or re-sizing of any kernel data structures.
+
+
+dentry-state
+------------
+
+This file shows the values in ``struct dentry_stat``, as defined in
+``linux/include/linux/dcache.h``::
+
+  struct dentry_stat_t dentry_stat {
+        int nr_dentry;
+        int nr_unused;
+        int age_limit;         /* age in seconds */
+        int want_pages;        /* pages requested by system */
+        int nr_negative;       /* # of unused negative dentries */
+        int dummy;             /* Reserved for future use */
+  };
+
+Dentries are dynamically allocated and deallocated.
+
+``nr_dentry`` shows the total number of dentries allocated (active
++ unused). ``nr_unused shows`` the number of dentries that are not
+actively used, but are saved in the LRU list for future reuse.
+
+``age_limit`` is the age in seconds after which dcache entries
+can be reclaimed when memory is short and ``want_pages`` is
+nonzero when ``shrink_dcache_pages()`` has been called and the
+dcache isn't pruned yet.
+
+``nr_negative`` shows the number of unused dentries that are also
+negative dentries which do not map to any files. Instead,
+they help speeding up rejection of non-existing files provided
+by the users.
+
+
+file-max & file-nr
+------------------
+
+The value in ``file-max`` denotes the maximum number of file-
+handles that the Linux kernel will allocate. When you get lots
+of error messages about running out of file handles, you might
+want to increase this limit.
+
+Historically,the kernel was able to allocate file handles
+dynamically, but not to free them again. The three values in
+``file-nr`` denote the number of allocated file handles, the number
+of allocated but unused file handles, and the maximum number of
+file handles. Linux 2.6 and later always reports 0 as the number of free
+file handles -- this is not an error, it just means that the
+number of allocated file handles exactly matches the number of
+used file handles.
+
+Attempts to allocate more file descriptors than ``file-max`` are
+reported with ``printk``, look for::
+
+  VFS: file-max limit <number> reached
+
+in the kernel logs.
+
+
+inode-nr & inode-state
+----------------------
+
+As with file handles, the kernel allocates the inode structures
+dynamically, but can't free them yet.
+
+The file ``inode-nr`` contains the first two items from
+``inode-state``, so we'll skip to that file...
+
+``inode-state`` contains three actual numbers and four dummies.
+The actual numbers are, in order of appearance, ``nr_inodes``,
+``nr_free_inodes`` and ``preshrink``.
+
+``nr_inodes`` stands for the number of inodes the system has
+allocated.
+
+``nr_free_inodes`` represents the number of free inodes (?) and
+preshrink is nonzero when the
+system needs to prune the inode list instead of allocating
+more.
+
+
+mount-max
+---------
+
+This denotes the maximum number of mounts that may exist
+in a mount namespace.
+
+
+nr_open
+-------
+
+This denotes the maximum number of file-handles a process can
+allocate. Default value is 1024*1024 (1048576) which should be
+enough for most machines. Actual limit depends on ``RLIMIT_NOFILE``
+resource limit.
+
+
+overflowgid & overflowuid
+-------------------------
+
+Some filesystems only support 16-bit UIDs and GIDs, although in Linux
+UIDs and GIDs are 32 bits. When one of these filesystems is mounted
+with writes enabled, any UID or GID that would exceed 65535 is translated
+to a fixed value before being written to disk.
+
+These sysctls allow you to change the value of the fixed UID and GID.
+The default is 65534.
+
+
+pipe-user-pages-hard
+--------------------
+
+Maximum total number of pages a non-privileged user may allocate for pipes.
+Once this limit is reached, no new pipes may be allocated until usage goes
+below the limit again. When set to 0, no limit is applied, which is the default
+setting.
+
+
+pipe-user-pages-soft
+--------------------
+
+Maximum total number of pages a non-privileged user may allocate for pipes
+before the pipe size gets limited to a single page. Once this limit is reached,
+new pipes will be limited to a single page in size for this user in order to
+limit total memory usage, and trying to increase them using ``fcntl()`` will be
+denied until usage goes below the limit again. The default value allows to
+allocate up to 1024 pipes at their default size. When set to 0, no limit is
+applied.
+
+
+protected_fifos
+---------------
+
+The intent of this protection is to avoid unintentional writes to
+an attacker-controlled FIFO, where a program expected to create a regular
+file.
+
+When set to "0", writing to FIFOs is unrestricted.
+
+When set to "1" don't allow ``O_CREAT`` open on FIFOs that we don't own
+in world writable sticky directories, unless they are owned by the
+owner of the directory.
+
+When set to "2" it also applies to group writable sticky directories.
+
+This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall.
+
+
+protected_hardlinks
+--------------------
+
+A long-standing class of security issues is the hardlink-based
+time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable
+directories like ``/tmp``. The common method of exploitation of this flaw
+is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given hardlink (i.e. a
+root process follows a hardlink created by another user). Additionally,
+on systems without separated partitions, this stops unauthorized users
+from "pinning" vulnerable setuid/setgid files against being upgraded by
+the administrator, or linking to special files.
+
+When set to "0", hardlink creation behavior is unrestricted.
+
+When set to "1" hardlinks cannot be created by users if they do not
+already own the source file, or do not have read/write access to it.
+
+This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall and grsecurity.
+
+
+protected_regular
+-----------------
+
+This protection is similar to `protected_fifos`_, but it
+avoids writes to an attacker-controlled regular file, where a program
+expected to create one.
+
+When set to "0", writing to regular files is unrestricted.
+
+When set to "1" don't allow ``O_CREAT`` open on regular files that we
+don't own in world writable sticky directories, unless they are
+owned by the owner of the directory.
+
+When set to "2" it also applies to group writable sticky directories.
+
+
+protected_symlinks
+------------------
+
+A long-standing class of security issues is the symlink-based
+time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable
+directories like ``/tmp``. The common method of exploitation of this flaw
+is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given symlink (i.e. a
+root process follows a symlink belonging to another user). For a likely
+incomplete list of hundreds of examples across the years, please see:
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=/tmp
+
+When set to "0", symlink following behavior is unrestricted.
+
+When set to "1" symlinks are permitted to be followed only when outside
+a sticky world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and
+follower match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner.
+
+This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall and grsecurity.
+
+
+suid_dumpable
+-------------
+
+This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid
+or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are
+
+=   ==========  ===============================================================
+0   (default)	Traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed
+		privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped.
+1   (debug)	All processes dump core when possible. The core dump is
+		owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is
+		intended for system debugging situations only.
+		Ptrace is unchecked.
+		This is insecure as it allows regular users to examine the
+		memory contents of privileged processes.
+2   (suidsafe)	Any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped
+		anyway, but only if the ``core_pattern`` kernel sysctl (see
+		:ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst <core_pattern>`)
+		is set to
+		either a pipe handler or a fully qualified path. (For more
+		details on this limitation, see CVE-2006-2451.) This mode is
+		appropriate when administrators are attempting to debug
+		problems in a normal environment, and either have a core dump
+		pipe handler that knows to treat privileged core dumps with
+		care, or specific directory defined for catching core dumps.
+		If a core dump happens without a pipe handler or fully
+		qualified path, a message will be emitted to syslog warning
+		about the lack of a correct setting.
+=   ==========  ===============================================================
+
+
+
+2. /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc
+===========================
+
+Documentation for the files in ``/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc`` is
+in Documentation/admin-guide/binfmt-misc.rst.
+
+
+3. /proc/sys/fs/mqueue - POSIX message queues filesystem
+========================================================
+
+
+The "mqueue"  filesystem provides  the necessary kernel features to enable the
+creation of a  user space  library that  implements  the  POSIX message queues
+API (as noted by the  MSG tag in the  POSIX 1003.1-2001 version  of the System
+Interfaces specification.)
+
+The "mqueue" filesystem contains values for determining/setting the
+amount of resources used by the file system.
+
+``/proc/sys/fs/mqueue/queues_max`` is a read/write file for
+setting/getting the maximum number of message queues allowed on the
+system.
+
+``/proc/sys/fs/mqueue/msg_max`` is a read/write file for
+setting/getting the maximum number of messages in a queue value.  In
+fact it is the limiting value for another (user) limit which is set in
+``mq_open`` invocation.  This attribute of a queue must be less than
+or equal to ``msg_max``.
+
+``/proc/sys/fs/mqueue/msgsize_max`` is a read/write file for
+setting/getting the maximum message size value (it is an attribute of
+every message queue, set during its creation).
+
+``/proc/sys/fs/mqueue/msg_default`` is a read/write file for
+setting/getting the default number of messages in a queue value if the
+``attr`` parameter of ``mq_open(2)`` is ``NULL``. If it exceeds
+``msg_max``, the default value is initialized to ``msg_max``.
+
+``/proc/sys/fs/mqueue/msgsize_default`` is a read/write file for
+setting/getting the default message size value if the ``attr``
+parameter of ``mq_open(2)`` is ``NULL``. If it exceeds
+``msgsize_max``, the default value is initialized to ``msgsize_max``.
+
+4. /proc/sys/fs/epoll - Configuration options for the epoll interface
+=====================================================================
+
+This directory contains configuration options for the epoll(7) interface.
+
+max_user_watches
+----------------
+
+Every epoll file descriptor can store a number of files to be monitored
+for event readiness. Each one of these monitored files constitutes a "watch".
+This configuration option sets the maximum number of "watches" that are
+allowed for each user.
+Each "watch" costs roughly 90 bytes on a 32-bit kernel, and roughly 160 bytes
+on a 64-bit one.
+The current default value for ``max_user_watches`` is 4% of the
+available low memory, divided by the "watch" cost in bytes.