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Diffstat (limited to 'source4/auth/ntlm/auth_sam.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | source4/auth/ntlm/auth_sam.c | 1417 |
1 files changed, 1417 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_sam.c b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_sam.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d12045d --- /dev/null +++ b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_sam.c @@ -0,0 +1,1417 @@ +/* + Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + Password and authentication handling + Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2001-2009 + Copyright (C) Gerald Carter 2003 + Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2005-2010 + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +*/ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "system/time.h" +#include <ldb.h> +#include "libcli/ldap/ldap_ndr.h" +#include "libcli/security/security.h" +#include "auth/auth.h" +#include "../libcli/auth/ntlm_check.h" +#include "auth/ntlm/auth_proto.h" +#include "auth/auth_sam.h" +#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h" +#include "dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/util.h" +#include "dsdb/common/util.h" +#include "param/param.h" +#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_irpc_c.h" +#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_winbind_c.h" +#include "lib/messaging/irpc.h" +#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h" +#include "libds/common/roles.h" +#include "lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h" +#include "system/kerberos.h" +#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h" +#include "kdc/authn_policy_util.h" +#include "kdc/db-glue.h" + +#undef DBGC_CLASS +#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH + +NTSTATUS auth_sam_init(void); + +extern const char *user_attrs[]; +extern const char *domain_ref_attrs[]; + +/**************************************************************************** + Do a specific test for an smb password being correct, given a smb_password and + the lanman and NT responses. +****************************************************************************/ +static NTSTATUS authsam_password_ok(struct auth4_context *auth_context, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const struct samr_Password *nt_pwd, + struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context, + const DATA_BLOB *stored_aes_256_key, + const krb5_data *salt, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, + DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key, + DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + + switch (user_info->password_state) { + case AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN: + { + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info_temp; + + if (nt_pwd == NULL && stored_aes_256_key != NULL && user_info->password.plaintext != NULL) { + bool pw_equal; + int krb5_ret; + DATA_BLOB supplied_aes_256_key; + krb5_keyblock key; + krb5_data cleartext_data = { + .data = user_info->password.plaintext, + .length = strlen(user_info->password.plaintext) + }; + + *lm_sess_key = data_blob_null; + *user_sess_key = data_blob_null; + + krb5_ret = smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, + NULL, + salt, + &cleartext_data, + ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, + &key); + if (krb5_ret) { + DBG_ERR("generation of a aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 key for password comparison failed: %s\n", + smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, + krb5_ret, mem_ctx)); + return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + supplied_aes_256_key = data_blob_const(KRB5_KEY_DATA(&key), + KRB5_KEY_LENGTH(&key)); + + pw_equal = data_blob_equal_const_time(&supplied_aes_256_key, + stored_aes_256_key); + + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &key); + if (!pw_equal) { + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + status = encrypt_user_info(mem_ctx, auth_context, + AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH, + user_info, &user_info_temp); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + DEBUG(1, ("Failed to convert plaintext password to password HASH: %s\n", nt_errstr(status))); + return status; + } + user_info = user_info_temp; + + FALL_THROUGH; + } + case AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH: + *lm_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0); + *user_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0); + status = hash_password_check(mem_ctx, + false, + lpcfg_ntlm_auth(auth_context->lp_ctx), + NULL, + user_info->password.hash.nt, + user_info->mapped.account_name, + NULL, nt_pwd); + NT_STATUS_NOT_OK_RETURN(status); + break; + + case AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE: + status = ntlm_password_check(mem_ctx, + false, + lpcfg_ntlm_auth(auth_context->lp_ctx), + user_info->logon_parameters, + &auth_context->challenge.data, + &user_info->password.response.lanman, + &user_info->password.response.nt, + user_info->mapped.account_name, + user_info->client.account_name, + user_info->client.domain_name, + NULL, nt_pwd, + user_sess_key, lm_sess_key); + NT_STATUS_NOT_OK_RETURN(status); + break; + } + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +static void auth_sam_trigger_zero_password(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx, + struct tevent_context *event_ctx, + struct netr_SendToSamBase *send_to_sam) +{ + struct dcerpc_binding_handle *irpc_handle; + struct winbind_SendToSam r; + struct tevent_req *req; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx; + + tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); + if (tmp_ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + irpc_handle = irpc_binding_handle_by_name(tmp_ctx, msg_ctx, + "winbind_server", + &ndr_table_winbind); + if (irpc_handle == NULL) { + DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Unable to get binding handle for winbind\n")); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return; + } + + r.in.message = *send_to_sam; + + /* + * This seem to rely on the current IRPC implementation, + * which delivers the message in the _send function. + * + * TODO: we need a ONE_WAY IRPC handle and register + * a callback and wait for it to be triggered! + */ + req = dcerpc_winbind_SendToSam_r_send(tmp_ctx, + event_ctx, + irpc_handle, + &r); + + /* we aren't interested in a reply */ + talloc_free(req); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + +} + +/* + send a message to the drepl server telling it to initiate a + REPL_SECRET getncchanges extended op to fetch the users secrets + */ +static void auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx, + struct tevent_context *event_ctx, + struct ldb_dn *user_dn) +{ + struct dcerpc_binding_handle *irpc_handle; + struct drepl_trigger_repl_secret r; + struct tevent_req *req; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx; + + tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); + if (tmp_ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + irpc_handle = irpc_binding_handle_by_name(tmp_ctx, msg_ctx, + "dreplsrv", + &ndr_table_irpc); + if (irpc_handle == NULL) { + DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Unable to get binding handle for dreplsrv\n")); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return; + } + + r.in.user_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(user_dn); + + /* + * This seem to rely on the current IRPC implementation, + * which delivers the message in the _send function. + * + * TODO: we need a ONE_WAY IRPC handle and register + * a callback and wait for it to be triggered! + */ + req = dcerpc_drepl_trigger_repl_secret_r_send(tmp_ctx, + event_ctx, + irpc_handle, + &r); + + /* we aren't interested in a reply */ + talloc_free(req); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); +} + +static const struct samr_Password *hide_invalid_nthash(const struct samr_Password *in) +{ + /* + * This is the result of: + * + * E_md4hash("", zero_string_hash.hash); + */ + static const struct samr_Password zero_string_hash = { + .hash = { + 0x31, 0xd6, 0xcf, 0xe0, 0xd1, 0x6a, 0xe9, 0x31, + 0xb7, 0x3c, 0x59, 0xd7, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x89, 0xc0, + } + }; + + if (in == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Skip over any all-zero hashes in the history. No known software + * stores these but just to be sure + */ + if (all_zero(in->hash, sizeof(in->hash))) { + return NULL; + } + + /* + * This looks odd, but the password_hash module in the past has written + * this in the rare situation where (somehow) we didn't have an old NT + * hash (one of the old LM-only set paths) + * + * mem_equal_const_time() is used to avoid a timing attack + * when comparing secret data in the server with this constant + * value. + */ + if (mem_equal_const_time(in->hash, zero_string_hash.hash, 16)) { + in = NULL; + } + + return in; +} + +/* + * Check that a password is OK, and update badPwdCount if required. + */ + +static NTSTATUS authsam_password_check_and_record(struct auth4_context *auth_context, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct ldb_dn *domain_dn, + struct ldb_message *msg, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, + DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key, + DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key, + bool *authoritative) +{ + NTSTATUS nt_status; + NTSTATUS auth_status; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx; + int i, ret; + int history_len = 0; + struct ldb_context *sam_ctx = auth_context->sam_ctx; + const char * const attrs[] = { "pwdHistoryLength", NULL }; + struct ldb_message *dom_msg; + struct samr_Password *nt_pwd; + DATA_BLOB _aes_256_key = data_blob_null; + DATA_BLOB *aes_256_key = NULL; + krb5_data _salt = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + krb5_data *salt = NULL; + DATA_BLOB salt_data = data_blob_null; + struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context = NULL; + const struct ldb_val *sc_val; + uint32_t userAccountControl = 0; + uint32_t current_kvno = 0; + bool am_rodc; + + tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); + if (tmp_ctx == NULL) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + /* + * This call does more than what it appears to do, it also + * checks for the account lockout. + * + * It is done here so that all parts of Samba that read the + * password refuse to even operate on it if the account is + * locked out, to avoid mistakes like CVE-2013-4496. + */ + nt_status = samdb_result_passwords(tmp_ctx, auth_context->lp_ctx, + msg, &nt_pwd); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; + } + + userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, + "userAccountControl", + 0); + + sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials"); + + if (nt_pwd == NULL && sc_val == NULL) { + if (samdb_rodc(auth_context->sam_ctx, &am_rodc) == LDB_SUCCESS && am_rodc) { + /* + * we don't have passwords for this + * account. We are an RODC, and this account + * may be one for which we either are denied + * REPL_SECRET replication or we haven't yet + * done the replication. We return + * NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED which tells the + * auth code to try the next authentication + * mechanism. We also send a message to our + * drepl server to tell it to try and + * replicate the secrets for this account. + * + * TODO: Should we only trigger this is detected + * there's a chance that the password might be + * replicated, we should be able to detect this + * based on msDS-NeverRevealGroup. + */ + auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(auth_context, + auth_context->msg_ctx, + auth_context->event_ctx, + msg->dn); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + } + + /* + * If we don't have an NT password, pull a kerberos key + * instead for plaintext. + */ + if (nt_pwd == NULL && + sc_val != NULL && + user_info->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN) + { + krb5_error_code krb5_ret; + + krb5_ret = smb_krb5_init_context(tmp_ctx, + auth_context->lp_ctx, + &smb_krb5_context); + if (krb5_ret != 0) { + DBG_ERR("Failed to setup krb5_context: %s!\n", + error_message(krb5_ret)); + return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* + * Get the current salt from the record + */ + + krb5_ret = dsdb_extract_aes_256_key(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, + tmp_ctx, + msg, + userAccountControl, + NULL, /* kvno */ + ¤t_kvno, /* kvno_out */ + &_aes_256_key, + &salt_data); + if (krb5_ret == 0) { + aes_256_key = &_aes_256_key; + + _salt.data = (char *)salt_data.data; + _salt.length = salt_data.length; + salt = &_salt; + } + } + + auth_status = authsam_password_ok(auth_context, + tmp_ctx, + nt_pwd, + smb_krb5_context, + aes_256_key, + salt, + user_info, + user_sess_key, lm_sess_key); + + if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(auth_status)) { + if (user_sess_key->data) { + talloc_steal(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data); + } + if (lm_sess_key->data) { + talloc_steal(mem_ctx, lm_sess_key->data); + } + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + *user_sess_key = data_blob_null; + *lm_sess_key = data_blob_null; + + if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(auth_status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD)) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return auth_status; + } + + /* + * We only continue if this was a wrong password + * and we'll always return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD + * no matter what error happens. + */ + + /* pull the domain password property attributes */ + ret = dsdb_search_one(sam_ctx, tmp_ctx, &dom_msg, domain_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE, + attrs, 0, "objectClass=domain"); + if (ret == LDB_SUCCESS) { + history_len = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(dom_msg, "pwdHistoryLength", 0); + } else if (ret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) { + DEBUG(3,("Couldn't find domain %s: %s!\n", + ldb_dn_get_linearized(domain_dn), + ldb_errstring(sam_ctx))); + } else { + DEBUG(3,("error finding domain %s: %s!\n", + ldb_dn_get_linearized(domain_dn), + ldb_errstring(sam_ctx))); + } + + for (i = 1; i < MIN(history_len, 3); i++) { + const struct samr_Password *nt_history_pwd = NULL; + NTTIME pwdLastSet; + struct timeval tv_now; + NTTIME now; + int allowed_period_mins; + NTTIME allowed_period; + + /* Reset these variables back to starting as empty */ + aes_256_key = NULL; + salt = NULL; + + /* + * Obtain the i'th old password from the NT password + * history for this user. + * + * We avoid issues with salts (which are not + * recorded for historical AES256 keys) by using the + * ntPwdHistory in preference. + */ + nt_status = samdb_result_passwords_from_history(tmp_ctx, + auth_context->lp_ctx, + msg, i, + NULL, + &nt_history_pwd); + + /* + * Belts and braces: note that + * samdb_result_passwords_from_history() currently + * does not fail for missing attributes, it only sets + * nt_history_pwd = NULL, so "break" and fall down to + * the bad password count update if this happens + */ + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + break; + } + + nt_history_pwd = hide_invalid_nthash(nt_history_pwd); + + /* + * We don't have an NT hash from the + * ntPwdHistory, but we can still perform the + * password check with the AES256 + * key. + * + * However, this is the second preference as + * it will fail if the account was renamed + * prior to a password change (as we won't + * have the correct salt available to + * calculate the AES256 key). + */ + + if (nt_history_pwd == NULL && sc_val != NULL && + user_info->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN && + current_kvno >= i) + { + krb5_error_code krb5_ret; + const uint32_t request_kvno = current_kvno - i; + + /* + * Confirm we have a krb5_context set up + */ + if (smb_krb5_context == NULL) { + /* + * We get here if we had a unicodePwd + * for the current password, no + * ntPwdHistory, a valid previous + * Kerberos history AND are processing + * a simple bind. + * + * This really is a corner case so + * favour cleaner code over trying to + * allow for an old password. It is + * more likely this is just a new + * account. + * + * "break" out of the loop and fall down + * to the bad password update + */ + break; + } + + /* + * Get the current salt from the record + */ + + krb5_ret = dsdb_extract_aes_256_key(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, + tmp_ctx, + msg, + userAccountControl, + &request_kvno, /* kvno */ + NULL, /* kvno_out */ + &_aes_256_key, + &salt_data); + if (krb5_ret != 0) { + break; + } + + aes_256_key = &_aes_256_key; + + _salt.data = (char *)salt_data.data; + _salt.length = salt_data.length; + salt = &_salt; + + } else if (nt_history_pwd == NULL) { + /* + * If we don't find element 'i' in the + * ntPwdHistory and can not fall back to the + * kerberos hash, we won't find 'i+1' ... + */ + break; + } + + auth_status = authsam_password_ok(auth_context, tmp_ctx, + nt_history_pwd, + smb_krb5_context, + aes_256_key, + salt, + user_info, + user_sess_key, + lm_sess_key); + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(auth_status)) { + /* + * If this was not a correct password, try the next + * one from the history + */ + *user_sess_key = data_blob_null; + *lm_sess_key = data_blob_null; + continue; + } + + if (i != 1) { + /* + * The authentication was OK, but not against + * the previous password, which is stored at index 1. + * + * We just return the original wrong password. + * This skips the update of the bad pwd count, + * because this is almost certainly user error + * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached + * password from before the password change), + * not an attack. + */ + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + + if (user_info->flags & USER_INFO_INTERACTIVE_LOGON) { + /* + * The authentication was OK against the previous password, + * but it's not a NTLM network authentication, + * LDAP simple bind or something similar. + * + * We just return the original wrong password. + * This skips the update of the bad pwd count, + * because this is almost certainly user error + * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached + * password from before the password change), + * not an attack. + */ + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + + /* + * If the password was OK, it's a NTLM network authentication + * and it was the previous password. + * + * Now we see if it is within the grace period, + * so that we don't break cached sessions on other computers + * before the user can lock and unlock their other screens + * (resetting their cached password). + * + * See http://support.microsoft.com/kb/906305 + * OldPasswordAllowedPeriod ("old password allowed period") + * is specified in minutes. The default is 60. + */ + allowed_period_mins = lpcfg_old_password_allowed_period(auth_context->lp_ctx); + /* + * NTTIME uses 100ns units + */ + allowed_period = (NTTIME) allowed_period_mins * + 60 * 1000*1000*10; + pwdLastSet = samdb_result_nttime(msg, "pwdLastSet", 0); + tv_now = timeval_current(); + now = timeval_to_nttime(&tv_now); + + if (now < pwdLastSet) { + /* + * time jump? + * + * We just return the original wrong password. + * This skips the update of the bad pwd count, + * because this is almost certainly user error + * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached + * password from before the password change), + * not an attack. + */ + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + + if ((now - pwdLastSet) >= allowed_period) { + /* + * The allowed period is over. + * + * We just return the original wrong password. + * This skips the update of the bad pwd count, + * because this is almost certainly user error + * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached + * password from before the password change), + * not an attack. + */ + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + + /* + * We finally allow the authentication with the + * previous password within the allowed period. + */ + if (user_sess_key->data) { + talloc_steal(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data); + } + if (lm_sess_key->data) { + talloc_steal(mem_ctx, lm_sess_key->data); + } + + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return auth_status; + } + + /* + * If we are not in the allowed period or match an old password, + * we didn't return early. Now update the badPwdCount et al. + */ + nt_status = authsam_update_bad_pwd_count(auth_context->sam_ctx, + msg, domain_dn); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + /* + * We need to return the original + * NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD error, so there isn't + * anything more we can do than write something into + * the log + */ + DEBUG(0, ("Failed to note bad password for user [%s]: %s\n", + user_info->mapped.account_name, + nt_errstr(nt_status))); + } + + if (samdb_rodc(auth_context->sam_ctx, &am_rodc) == LDB_SUCCESS && am_rodc) { + *authoritative = false; + } + + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + + if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + nt_status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + return nt_status; +} + +static NTSTATUS authsam_check_netlogon_trust(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct ldb_context *sam_ctx, + struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, + const struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc, + struct authn_audit_info **server_audit_info_out) +{ + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = NULL; + + static const char *authn_policy_silo_attrs[] = { + "msDS-AssignedAuthNPolicy", + "msDS-AssignedAuthNPolicySilo", + "objectClass", /* used to determine which set of policy + * attributes apply. */ + NULL, + }; + + const struct authn_server_policy *authn_server_policy = NULL; + + struct dom_sid_buf netlogon_trust_sid_buf; + const char *netlogon_trust_sid_str = NULL; + struct ldb_dn *netlogon_trust_dn = NULL; + struct ldb_message *netlogon_trust_msg = NULL; + + int ret; + + /* Have we established a secure channel? */ + if (user_info->netlogon_trust_account.secure_channel_type == SEC_CHAN_NULL) { + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + if (!authn_policy_silos_and_policies_in_effect(sam_ctx)) { + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + /* + * We have established a secure channel, and we should have the machine + * account’s SID. + */ + SMB_ASSERT(user_info->netlogon_trust_account.sid != NULL); + + tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); + if (tmp_ctx == NULL) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + netlogon_trust_sid_str = dom_sid_str_buf(user_info->netlogon_trust_account.sid, + &netlogon_trust_sid_buf); + + netlogon_trust_dn = ldb_dn_new_fmt(tmp_ctx, sam_ctx, + "<SID=%s>", + netlogon_trust_sid_str); + if (netlogon_trust_dn == NULL) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + /* + * Look up the machine account to see if it has an applicable + * authentication policy. + */ + ret = dsdb_search_one(sam_ctx, + tmp_ctx, + &netlogon_trust_msg, + netlogon_trust_dn, + LDB_SCOPE_BASE, + authn_policy_silo_attrs, + 0, + NULL); + if (ret) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return dsdb_ldb_err_to_ntstatus(ret); + } + + ret = authn_policy_server(sam_ctx, + tmp_ctx, + netlogon_trust_msg, + &authn_server_policy); + if (ret) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + if (authn_server_policy != NULL) { + struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info = NULL; + NTSTATUS status; + + /* + * An authentication policy applies to the machine + * account. Carry out the access check. + */ + status = authn_policy_authenticate_to_service(tmp_ctx, + sam_ctx, + lp_ctx, + AUTHN_POLICY_AUTH_TYPE_NTLM, + user_info_dc, + NULL /* device_info */, + /* + * It seems that claims go ignored for + * SamLogon (see SamLogonTests — + * test_samlogon_allowed_to_computer_silo). + */ + (struct auth_claims) {}, + authn_server_policy, + (struct authn_policy_flags) {}, + &server_audit_info); + if (server_audit_info != NULL) { + *server_audit_info_out = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &server_audit_info); + } + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return status; + } + } + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +static NTSTATUS authsam_authenticate(struct auth4_context *auth_context, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct ldb_dn *domain_dn, + struct ldb_message *msg, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, + const struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc, + DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key, DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key, + struct authn_audit_info **client_audit_info_out, + struct authn_audit_info **server_audit_info_out, + bool *authoritative) +{ + NTSTATUS nt_status; + int ret; + bool interactive = (user_info->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH); + uint32_t acct_flags = samdb_result_acct_flags(msg, NULL); + struct netr_SendToSamBase *send_to_sam = NULL; + const struct authn_ntlm_client_policy *authn_client_policy = NULL; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); + if (!tmp_ctx) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + /* You can only do an interactive login to normal accounts */ + if (user_info->flags & USER_INFO_INTERACTIVE_LOGON) { + if (!(acct_flags & ACB_NORMAL)) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER; + } + if (acct_flags & ACB_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) { + if (acct_flags & ACB_DISABLED) { + DEBUG(2,("authsam_authenticate: Account for user '%s' " + "was disabled.\n", + user_info->mapped.account_name)); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED; + } + DEBUG(2,("authsam_authenticate: Account for user '%s' " + "requires interactive smartcard logon.\n", + user_info->mapped.account_name)); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_SMARTCARD_LOGON_REQUIRED; + } + } + + /* See whether an authentication policy applies to the client. */ + ret = authn_policy_ntlm_client(auth_context->sam_ctx, + tmp_ctx, + msg, + &authn_client_policy); + if (ret) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + nt_status = authn_policy_ntlm_apply_device_restriction(mem_ctx, + authn_client_policy, + client_audit_info_out); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + /* + * As we didn’t get far enough to check the server policy, only + * the client policy will be referenced in the authentication + * log message. + */ + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; + } + + nt_status = authsam_password_check_and_record(auth_context, tmp_ctx, + domain_dn, msg, + user_info, + user_sess_key, lm_sess_key, + authoritative); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; + } + + nt_status = authsam_check_netlogon_trust(mem_ctx, + auth_context->sam_ctx, + auth_context->lp_ctx, + user_info, + user_info_dc, + server_audit_info_out); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; + } + + nt_status = authsam_account_ok(tmp_ctx, auth_context->sam_ctx, + user_info->logon_parameters, + domain_dn, + msg, + user_info->workstation_name, + user_info->mapped.account_name, + false, false); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; + } + + nt_status = authsam_logon_success_accounting(auth_context->sam_ctx, + msg, domain_dn, + interactive, + tmp_ctx, + &send_to_sam); + + if (send_to_sam != NULL) { + auth_sam_trigger_zero_password(tmp_ctx, + auth_context->msg_ctx, + auth_context->event_ctx, + send_to_sam); + } + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; + } + + if (user_sess_key && user_sess_key->data) { + talloc_steal(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data); + } + if (lm_sess_key && lm_sess_key->data) { + talloc_steal(mem_ctx, lm_sess_key->data); + } + + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; +} + + + +static NTSTATUS authsam_check_password_internals(struct auth_method_context *ctx, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, + struct auth_user_info_dc **user_info_dc, + struct authn_audit_info **client_audit_info_out, + struct authn_audit_info **server_audit_info_out, + bool *authoritative) +{ + NTSTATUS nt_status; + int result; + const char *account_name = user_info->mapped.account_name; + struct ldb_message *msg; + struct ldb_dn *domain_dn; + DATA_BLOB user_sess_key, lm_sess_key; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx; + const char *p = NULL; + struct auth_user_info_dc *reparented = NULL; + struct authn_audit_info *client_audit_info = NULL; + struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info = NULL; + + if (ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx == NULL) { + DEBUG(0, ("No SAM available, cannot log in users\n")); + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE; + } + + if (!account_name || !*account_name) { + /* 'not for me' */ + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); + if (!tmp_ctx) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + domain_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx); + if (domain_dn == NULL) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN; + } + + /* + * If we have not already mapped this user, then now is a good + * time to do so, before we look it up. We used to do this + * earlier, but in a multi-forest environment we want to do + * this mapping at the final domain. + * + * However, on the flip side we may have already mapped the + * user if this was an LDAP simple bind, in which case we + * really, really want to get back to exactly the same account + * we got the DN for. + */ + if (!user_info->cracknames_called) { + p = strchr_m(account_name, '@'); + } else { + /* + * This is slightly nicer than double-indenting the + * block below + */ + p = NULL; + } + + if (p != NULL) { + const char *nt4_domain = NULL; + const char *nt4_account = NULL; + bool is_my_domain = false; + + nt_status = crack_name_to_nt4_name(mem_ctx, + ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, + /* + * DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_UPN_FOR_LOGON ? + */ + DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_USER_PRINCIPAL, + account_name, + &nt4_domain, &nt4_account); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER; + } + + is_my_domain = lpcfg_is_mydomain(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx, nt4_domain); + if (!is_my_domain) { + /* + * This is a user within our forest, + * but in a different domain, + * we're not authoritative + */ + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + /* + * Let's use the NT4 account name for the lookup. + */ + account_name = nt4_account; + } + + nt_status = authsam_search_account(tmp_ctx, ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, account_name, domain_dn, &msg); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; + } + + nt_status = authsam_make_user_info_dc(tmp_ctx, ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, + lpcfg_netbios_name(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx), + lpcfg_sam_name(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx), + lpcfg_sam_dnsname(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx), + domain_dn, + msg, + data_blob_null, data_blob_null, + user_info_dc); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; + } + + result = dsdb_is_protected_user(ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, + (*user_info_dc)->sids, + (*user_info_dc)->num_sids); + /* + * We also consider an error result (a negative value) as denying the + * authentication. + */ + if (result != 0) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_RESTRICTION; + } + + nt_status = authsam_authenticate(ctx->auth_ctx, + tmp_ctx, + domain_dn, + msg, + user_info, + *user_info_dc, + &user_sess_key, + &lm_sess_key, + &client_audit_info, + &server_audit_info, + authoritative); + if (client_audit_info != NULL) { + *client_audit_info_out = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &client_audit_info); + } + if (server_audit_info != NULL) { + *server_audit_info_out = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &server_audit_info); + } + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; + } + + (*user_info_dc)->user_session_key = data_blob_talloc(*user_info_dc, + user_sess_key.data, + user_sess_key.length); + if (user_sess_key.data) { + if ((*user_info_dc)->user_session_key.data == NULL) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + } + + (*user_info_dc)->lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(*user_info_dc, + lm_sess_key.data, + lm_sess_key.length); + if (lm_sess_key.data) { + if ((*user_info_dc)->lm_session_key.data == NULL) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + } + + /* + * Release our handle to *user_info_dc. {client,server}_audit_info_out, + * if non-NULL, becomes the new parent. + */ + reparented = talloc_reparent(tmp_ctx, mem_ctx, *user_info_dc); + if (reparented == NULL) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +struct authsam_check_password_state { + struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc; + struct authn_audit_info *client_audit_info; + struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info; + bool authoritative; +}; + +static struct tevent_req *authsam_check_password_send( + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct tevent_context *ev, + struct auth_method_context *ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info) +{ + struct tevent_req *req = NULL; + struct authsam_check_password_state *state = NULL; + NTSTATUS status; + + req = tevent_req_create( + mem_ctx, &state, struct authsam_check_password_state); + if (req == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + /* + * authsam_check_password_internals() sets this to false in + * the rodc case, otherwise it leaves it untouched. Default to + * "we're authoritative". + */ + state->authoritative = true; + + status = authsam_check_password_internals( + ctx, + state, + user_info, + &state->user_info_dc, + &state->client_audit_info, + &state->server_audit_info, + &state->authoritative); + if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) { + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + + tevent_req_done(req); + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); +} + +static NTSTATUS authsam_check_password_recv( + struct tevent_req *req, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct auth_user_info_dc **interim_info, + const struct authn_audit_info **client_audit_info, + const struct authn_audit_info **server_audit_info, + bool *authoritative) +{ + struct authsam_check_password_state *state = tevent_req_data( + req, struct authsam_check_password_state); + NTSTATUS status; + + *authoritative = state->authoritative; + + *client_audit_info = talloc_reparent(state, mem_ctx, state->client_audit_info); + state->client_audit_info = NULL; + + *server_audit_info = talloc_reparent(state, mem_ctx, state->server_audit_info); + state->server_audit_info = NULL; + + if (tevent_req_is_nterror(req, &status)) { + tevent_req_received(req); + return status; + } + /* + * Release our handle to state->user_info_dc. + * {client,server}_audit_info, if non-NULL, becomes the new parent. + */ + *interim_info = talloc_reparent(state, mem_ctx, state->user_info_dc); + state->user_info_dc = NULL; + + tevent_req_received(req); + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +static NTSTATUS authsam_ignoredomain_want_check(struct auth_method_context *ctx, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info) +{ + if (!user_info->mapped.account_name || !*user_info->mapped.account_name) { + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +/**************************************************************************** +Check SAM security (above) but with a few extra checks. +****************************************************************************/ +static NTSTATUS authsam_want_check(struct auth_method_context *ctx, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info) +{ + const char *effective_domain = user_info->mapped.domain_name; + bool is_local_name = false; + bool is_my_domain = false; + const char *p = NULL; + struct dsdb_trust_routing_table *trt = NULL; + const struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx *tdo = NULL; + NTSTATUS status; + + if (!user_info->mapped.account_name || !*user_info->mapped.account_name) { + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + if (effective_domain == NULL) { + effective_domain = ""; + } + + is_local_name = lpcfg_is_myname(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx, + effective_domain); + + /* check whether or not we service this domain/workgroup name */ + switch (lpcfg_server_role(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx)) { + case ROLE_STANDALONE: + return NT_STATUS_OK; + + case ROLE_DOMAIN_MEMBER: + if (is_local_name) { + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + DBG_DEBUG("%s is not one of my local names (DOMAIN_MEMBER)\n", + effective_domain); + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + + case ROLE_ACTIVE_DIRECTORY_DC: + /* handled later */ + break; + + default: + DBG_ERR("lpcfg_server_role() has an undefined value\n"); + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SERVER_STATE; + } + + /* + * Now we handle the AD DC case... + */ + + is_my_domain = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx, + effective_domain); + if (is_my_domain) { + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + if (user_info->cracknames_called) { + /* + * The caller already did a cracknames call. + */ + DBG_DEBUG("%s is not own domain name (DC)\n", + effective_domain); + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + if (!strequal(effective_domain, "")) { + DBG_DEBUG("%s is not own domain name (DC)\n", + effective_domain); + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + p = strchr_m(user_info->mapped.account_name, '@'); + if (p == NULL) { + /* + * An empty to domain name should be handled + * as the local domain name. + */ + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + effective_domain = p + 1; + is_my_domain = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx, + effective_domain); + if (is_my_domain) { + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + if (strequal(effective_domain, "")) { + DBG_DEBUG("authsam_check_password: upn without realm (DC)\n"); + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + /* + * as last option we check the routing table if the + * domain is within our forest. + */ + status = dsdb_trust_routing_table_load(ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, + mem_ctx, &trt); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + DBG_ERR("authsam_check_password: dsdb_trust_routing_table_load() %s\n", + nt_errstr(status)); + return status; + } + + tdo = dsdb_trust_routing_by_name(trt, effective_domain); + if (tdo == NULL) { + DBG_DEBUG("%s is not a known TLN (DC)\n", + effective_domain); + TALLOC_FREE(trt); + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + if (!(tdo->trust_attributes & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST)) { + DBG_DEBUG("%s is not a TLN in our forest (DC)\n", + effective_domain); + TALLOC_FREE(trt); + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + /* + * This principal is within our forest. + * we'll later do a crack_name_to_nt4_name() + * to check if it's in our domain. + */ + TALLOC_FREE(trt); + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +static const struct auth_operations sam_ignoredomain_ops = { + .name = "sam_ignoredomain", + .want_check = authsam_ignoredomain_want_check, + .check_password_send = authsam_check_password_send, + .check_password_recv = authsam_check_password_recv, +}; + +static const struct auth_operations sam_ops = { + .name = "sam", + .want_check = authsam_want_check, + .check_password_send = authsam_check_password_send, + .check_password_recv = authsam_check_password_recv, +}; + +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth4_sam_init(TALLOC_CTX *); +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth4_sam_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx) +{ + NTSTATUS ret; + + ret = auth_register(ctx, &sam_ops); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) { + DEBUG(0,("Failed to register 'sam' auth backend!\n")); + return ret; + } + + ret = auth_register(ctx, &sam_ignoredomain_ops); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) { + DEBUG(0,("Failed to register 'sam_ignoredomain' auth backend!\n")); + return ret; + } + + return ret; +} |