diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'source4/auth/ntlm')
| -rw-r--r-- | source4/auth/ntlm/auth.c | 869 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | source4/auth/ntlm/auth_anonymous.c | 166 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | source4/auth/ntlm/auth_developer.c | 224 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | source4/auth/ntlm/auth_sam.c | 1417 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | source4/auth/ntlm/auth_server_service.c | 29 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | source4/auth/ntlm/auth_simple.c | 221 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | source4/auth/ntlm/auth_util.c | 183 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | source4/auth/ntlm/auth_winbind.c | 326 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | source4/auth/ntlm/wscript_build | 51 |
9 files changed, 3486 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source4/auth/ntlm/auth.c b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3ad18bd --- /dev/null +++ b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth.c @@ -0,0 +1,869 @@ +/* + Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + Password and authentication handling + Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001-2002 + Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2005 + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +*/ + +#include "includes.h" +#include <tevent.h> +#include "../lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h" +#include "../lib/util/dlinklist.h" +#include "auth/auth.h" +#include "auth/ntlm/auth_proto.h" +#include "param/param.h" +#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h" +#include "libcli/wbclient/wbclient.h" +#include "lib/util/samba_modules.h" +#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h" +#include "system/kerberos.h" +#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h" +#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos_util.h" +#include "libds/common/roles.h" + +#undef DBGC_CLASS +#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH + +static NTSTATUS auth_generate_session_info_wrapper(struct auth4_context *auth_context, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + void *server_returned_info, + const char *original_user_name, + uint32_t session_info_flags, + struct auth_session_info **session_info); + +/*************************************************************************** + Set a fixed challenge +***************************************************************************/ +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth_context_set_challenge(struct auth4_context *auth_ctx, const uint8_t chal[8], const char *set_by) +{ + auth_ctx->challenge.set_by = talloc_strdup(auth_ctx, set_by); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(auth_ctx->challenge.set_by); + + auth_ctx->challenge.data = data_blob_talloc(auth_ctx, chal, 8); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(auth_ctx->challenge.data.data); + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Try to get a challenge out of the various authentication modules. + Returns a const char of length 8 bytes. +****************************************************************************/ +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth_get_challenge(struct auth4_context *auth_ctx, uint8_t chal[8]) +{ + + if (auth_ctx->challenge.data.length == 8) { + DEBUG(5, ("auth_get_challenge: returning previous challenge by module %s (normal)\n", + auth_ctx->challenge.set_by)); + memcpy(chal, auth_ctx->challenge.data.data, 8); + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + if (!auth_ctx->challenge.set_by) { + generate_random_buffer(chal, 8); + + auth_ctx->challenge.data = data_blob_talloc(auth_ctx, chal, 8); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(auth_ctx->challenge.data.data); + auth_ctx->challenge.set_by = "random"; + } + + DEBUG(10,("auth_get_challenge: challenge set by %s\n", + auth_ctx->challenge.set_by)); + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +/** + * Check a user's Plaintext, LM or NTLM password. + * (sync version) + * + * Check a user's password, as given in the user_info struct and return various + * interesting details in the user_info_dc struct. + * + * The return value takes precedence over the contents of the user_info_dc + * struct. When the return is other than NT_STATUS_OK the contents + * of that structure is undefined. + * + * @param auth_ctx Supplies the challenges and some other data. + * Must be created with auth_context_create(), and the challenges should be + * filled in, either at creation or by calling the challenge generation + * function auth_get_challenge(). + * + * @param user_info Contains the user supplied components, including the passwords. + * + * @param mem_ctx The parent memory context for the user_info_dc structure + * + * @param user_info_dc If successful, contains information about the authentication, + * including a SAM_ACCOUNT struct describing the user. + * + * @return An NTSTATUS with NT_STATUS_OK or an appropriate error. + * + **/ + +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth_check_password(struct auth4_context *auth_ctx, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, + struct auth_user_info_dc **user_info_dc, + uint8_t *pauthoritative) +{ + struct tevent_req *subreq; + struct tevent_context *ev; + bool ok; + NTSTATUS status; + + /*TODO: create a new event context here! */ + ev = auth_ctx->event_ctx; + + /* + * We are authoritative by default + */ + *pauthoritative = 1; + + subreq = auth_check_password_send(mem_ctx, + ev, + auth_ctx, + user_info); + if (subreq == NULL) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + ok = tevent_req_poll(subreq, ev); + if (!ok) { + return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + status = auth_check_password_recv(subreq, mem_ctx, + user_info_dc, pauthoritative); + TALLOC_FREE(subreq); + + return status; +} + +struct auth_check_password_state { + struct tevent_context *ev; + struct auth4_context *auth_ctx; + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info; + struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc; + struct auth_method_context *method; + const struct authn_audit_info *client_audit_info; + const struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info; + uint8_t authoritative; +}; + +static void auth_check_password_next(struct tevent_req *req); + +/** + * Check a user's Plaintext, LM or NTLM password. + * async send hook + * + * Check a user's password, as given in the user_info struct and return various + * interesting details in the user_info_dc struct. + * + * The return value takes precedence over the contents of the user_info_dc + * struct. When the return is other than NT_STATUS_OK the contents + * of that structure is undefined. + * + * @param mem_ctx The memory context the request should operate on + * + * @param ev The tevent context the request should operate on + * + * @param auth_ctx Supplies the challenges and some other data. Must + * be created with make_auth_context(), and the + * challenges should be filled in, either at creation + * or by calling the challenge generation function + * auth_get_challenge(). + * + * @param user_info Contains the user supplied components, including the passwords. + * + * @return The request handle or NULL on no memory error. + * + **/ + +_PUBLIC_ struct tevent_req *auth_check_password_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct tevent_context *ev, + struct auth4_context *auth_ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info) +{ + struct tevent_req *req; + struct auth_check_password_state *state; + /* if all the modules say 'not for me' this is reasonable */ + NTSTATUS nt_status; + uint8_t chal[8]; + + DEBUG(3,("auth_check_password_send: " + "Checking password for unmapped user [%s]\\[%s]@[%s]\n", + user_info->client.domain_name, user_info->client.account_name, + user_info->workstation_name)); + + req = tevent_req_create(mem_ctx, &state, + struct auth_check_password_state); + if (req == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + /* + * We are authoritative by default. + */ + state->ev = ev; + state->auth_ctx = auth_ctx; + state->user_info = user_info; + state->authoritative = 1; + + if (user_info->mapped.account_name == NULL) { + struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info_tmp; + + /* + * We don't really do any mapping here. + * + * It's up to the backends to do mappings + * for their authentication. + */ + user_info_tmp = talloc_zero(state, struct auth_usersupplied_info); + if (tevent_req_nomem(user_info_tmp, req)) { + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + + /* + * The lifetime of user_info is longer than + * user_info_tmp, so we don't need to copy the + * strings. + */ + *user_info_tmp = *user_info; + user_info_tmp->mapped.domain_name = user_info->client.domain_name; + user_info_tmp->mapped.account_name = user_info->client.account_name; + + user_info = user_info_tmp; + state->user_info = user_info_tmp; + } + + DEBUGADD(3,("auth_check_password_send: " + "user is: [%s]\\[%s]@[%s]\n", + user_info->mapped.domain_name, + user_info->mapped.account_name, + user_info->workstation_name)); + + nt_status = auth_get_challenge(auth_ctx, chal); + if (tevent_req_nterror(req, nt_status)) { + DEBUG(0,("auth_check_password_send: " + "Invalid challenge (length %u) stored for " + "this auth context set_by %s - cannot continue: %s\n", + (unsigned)auth_ctx->challenge.data.length, + auth_ctx->challenge.set_by, + nt_errstr(nt_status))); + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + + if (auth_ctx->challenge.set_by) { + DEBUG(10,("auth_check_password_send: " + "auth_context challenge created by %s\n", + auth_ctx->challenge.set_by)); + } + + DEBUG(10, ("auth_check_password_send: challenge is: \n")); + dump_data(5, auth_ctx->challenge.data.data, + auth_ctx->challenge.data.length); + + state->method = state->auth_ctx->methods; + auth_check_password_next(req); + if (!tevent_req_is_in_progress(req)) { + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + + return req; +} + +static void auth_check_password_done(struct tevent_req *subreq); + +static void auth_check_password_next(struct tevent_req *req) +{ + struct auth_check_password_state *state = + tevent_req_data(req, struct auth_check_password_state); + struct tevent_req *subreq = NULL; + NTSTATUS status; + + if (state->method == NULL) { + state->authoritative = 0; + tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER); + return; + } + + /* check if the module wants to check the password */ + status = state->method->ops->want_check(state->method, state, + state->user_info); + if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED)) { + DEBUG(11,("auth_check_password_send: " + "%s doesn't want to check\n", + state->method->ops->name)); + state->method = state->method->next; + auth_check_password_next(req); + return; + } + + if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) { + return; + } + + subreq = state->method->ops->check_password_send( + state, state->ev, state->method, state->user_info); + if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) { + return; + } + tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, auth_check_password_done, req); +} + +static void auth_check_password_done(struct tevent_req *subreq) +{ + struct tevent_req *req = + tevent_req_callback_data(subreq, + struct tevent_req); + struct auth_check_password_state *state = + tevent_req_data(req, + struct auth_check_password_state); + bool authoritative = true; + NTSTATUS status; + + status = state->method->ops->check_password_recv(subreq, state, + &state->user_info_dc, + &state->client_audit_info, + &state->server_audit_info, + &authoritative); + TALLOC_FREE(subreq); + if (!authoritative || + NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED)) { + DEBUG(11,("auth_check_password_send: " + "%s passes to the next method\n", + state->method->ops->name)); + state->method = state->method->next; + auth_check_password_next(req); + return; + } + + /* the backend has handled the request */ + + if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) { + return; + } + + tevent_req_done(req); +} + +/** + * Check a user's Plaintext, LM or NTLM password. + * async receive function + * + * The return value takes precedence over the contents of the user_info_dc + * struct. When the return is other than NT_STATUS_OK the contents + * of that structure is undefined. + * + * + * @param req The async request state + * + * @param mem_ctx The parent memory context for the user_info_dc structure + * + * @param user_info_dc If successful, contains information about the authentication, + * including a SAM_ACCOUNT struct describing the user. + * + * @return An NTSTATUS with NT_STATUS_OK or an appropriate error. + * + **/ + +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth_check_password_recv(struct tevent_req *req, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct auth_user_info_dc **user_info_dc, + uint8_t *pauthoritative) +{ + struct auth_check_password_state *state = + tevent_req_data(req, struct auth_check_password_state); + NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK; + + *pauthoritative = state->authoritative; + + if (tevent_req_is_nterror(req, &status)) { + /* + * Please try not to change this string, it is probably in use + * in audit logging tools + */ + DEBUG(2,("auth_check_password_recv: " + "%s authentication for user [%s\\%s] " + "FAILED with error %s, authoritative=%u\n", + (state->method ? state->method->ops->name : "NO_METHOD"), + state->user_info->mapped.domain_name, + state->user_info->mapped.account_name, + nt_errstr(status), state->authoritative)); + + log_authentication_event(state->auth_ctx->msg_ctx, + state->auth_ctx->lp_ctx, + &state->auth_ctx->start_time, + state->user_info, status, + NULL, NULL, NULL, + state->client_audit_info, + state->server_audit_info); + tevent_req_received(req); + return status; + } + + DEBUG(5,("auth_check_password_recv: " + "%s authentication for user [%s\\%s] succeeded\n", + state->method->ops->name, + state->user_info_dc->info->domain_name, + state->user_info_dc->info->account_name)); + + log_authentication_event(state->auth_ctx->msg_ctx, + state->auth_ctx->lp_ctx, + &state->auth_ctx->start_time, + state->user_info, status, + state->user_info_dc->info->domain_name, + state->user_info_dc->info->account_name, + &state->user_info_dc->sids[PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX].sid, + state->client_audit_info, + state->server_audit_info); + + /* + * Release our handle to state->user_info_dc. + * state->{client,server}_audit_info, if non-NULL, becomes the new + * parent. + */ + *user_info_dc = talloc_reparent(state, mem_ctx, state->user_info_dc); + state->user_info_dc = NULL; + + tevent_req_received(req); + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +struct auth_check_password_wrapper_state { + uint8_t authoritative; + struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc; +}; + +static void auth_check_password_wrapper_done(struct tevent_req *subreq); + +static struct tevent_req *auth_check_password_wrapper_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct tevent_context *ev, + struct auth4_context *auth_ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info) +{ + struct tevent_req *req = NULL; + struct auth_check_password_wrapper *state = NULL; + struct tevent_req *subreq = NULL; + + req = tevent_req_create(mem_ctx, &state, + struct auth_check_password_wrapper_state); + if (req == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + subreq = auth_check_password_send(state, ev, auth_ctx, user_info); + if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) { + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, + auth_check_password_wrapper_done, + req); + + return req; +} + +static void auth_check_password_wrapper_done(struct tevent_req *subreq) +{ + struct tevent_req *req = + tevent_req_callback_data(subreq, + struct tevent_req); + struct auth_check_password_wrapper_state *state = + tevent_req_data(req, + struct auth_check_password_wrapper_state); + NTSTATUS status; + + status = auth_check_password_recv(subreq, state, + &state->user_info_dc, + &state->authoritative); + TALLOC_FREE(subreq); + if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) { + return; + } + + tevent_req_done(req); +} + +static NTSTATUS auth_check_password_wrapper_recv(struct tevent_req *req, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + uint8_t *pauthoritative, + void **server_returned_info, + DATA_BLOB *user_session_key, + DATA_BLOB *lm_session_key) +{ + struct auth_check_password_wrapper_state *state = + tevent_req_data(req, + struct auth_check_password_wrapper_state); + struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc = state->user_info_dc; + NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK; + + *pauthoritative = state->authoritative; + + if (tevent_req_is_nterror(req, &status)) { + tevent_req_received(req); + return status; + } + + talloc_steal(mem_ctx, user_info_dc); + *server_returned_info = user_info_dc; + + if (user_session_key) { + DEBUG(10, ("Got NT session key of length %u\n", + (unsigned)user_info_dc->user_session_key.length)); + *user_session_key = user_info_dc->user_session_key; + talloc_steal(mem_ctx, user_session_key->data); + user_info_dc->user_session_key = data_blob_null; + } + + if (lm_session_key) { + DEBUG(10, ("Got LM session key of length %u\n", + (unsigned)user_info_dc->lm_session_key.length)); + *lm_session_key = user_info_dc->lm_session_key; + talloc_steal(mem_ctx, lm_session_key->data); + user_info_dc->lm_session_key = data_blob_null; + } + + tevent_req_received(req); + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + + /* Wrapper because we don't want to expose all callers to needing to + * know that session_info is generated from the main ldb, and because + * we need to break a dependency loop between the DCE/RPC layer and the + * generation of unix tokens via IRPC */ +static NTSTATUS auth_generate_session_info_wrapper(struct auth4_context *auth_context, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + void *server_returned_info, + const char *original_user_name, + uint32_t session_info_flags, + struct auth_session_info **session_info) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc = talloc_get_type_abort(server_returned_info, struct auth_user_info_dc); + + if (!(user_info_dc->info->user_flags & NETLOGON_GUEST)) { + session_info_flags |= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_AUTHENTICATED; + } + + status = auth_generate_session_info(mem_ctx, + auth_context->lp_ctx, + auth_context->sam_ctx, + user_info_dc, + session_info_flags, + session_info); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + return status; + } + + if ((session_info_flags & AUTH_SESSION_INFO_UNIX_TOKEN) + && NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + status = auth_session_info_fill_unix(auth_context->lp_ctx, + original_user_name, + *session_info); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + TALLOC_FREE(*session_info); + } + } + return status; +} + +/* Wrapper because we don't want to expose all callers to needing to + * know anything about the PAC or auth subsystem internal structures + * before we output a struct auth session_info */ +static NTSTATUS auth_generate_session_info_pac(struct auth4_context *auth_ctx, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context, + DATA_BLOB *pac_blob, + const char *principal_name, + const struct tsocket_address *remote_address, + uint32_t session_info_flags, + struct auth_session_info **session_info) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx; + + if (!pac_blob) { + /* + * This should already have been caught at the main + * gensec layer, but better check twice + */ + return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + tmp_ctx = talloc_named(mem_ctx, 0, "gensec_gssapi_session_info context"); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(tmp_ctx); + + /* + * FIXME: To correctly create the security token, we also need to get the + * claims info, device info, and device claims info from the PAC. For now, + * we support claims only in the KDC. + */ + status = kerberos_pac_blob_to_user_info_dc(tmp_ctx, + *pac_blob, + smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, + &user_info_dc, NULL, NULL); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return status; + } + + if (!(user_info_dc->info->user_flags & NETLOGON_GUEST)) { + session_info_flags |= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_AUTHENTICATED; + } + + status = auth_generate_session_info_wrapper(auth_ctx, mem_ctx, + user_info_dc, + user_info_dc->info->account_name, + session_info_flags, session_info); + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return status; +} + +/*************************************************************************** + Make a auth_info struct for the auth subsystem + - Allow the caller to specify the methods to use, including optionally the SAM to use +***************************************************************************/ +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth_context_create_methods(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const char * const *methods, + struct tevent_context *ev, + struct imessaging_context *msg, + struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx, + struct ldb_context *sam_ctx, + struct auth4_context **auth_ctx) +{ + int i; + struct auth4_context *ctx; + + auth4_init(); + + if (!ev) { + DEBUG(0,("auth_context_create: called with out event context\n")); + return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct auth4_context); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(ctx); + ctx->challenge.data = data_blob(NULL, 0); + ctx->methods = NULL; + ctx->event_ctx = ev; + ctx->msg_ctx = msg; + ctx->lp_ctx = lp_ctx; + ctx->start_time = timeval_current(); + + if (sam_ctx) { + ctx->sam_ctx = sam_ctx; + } else { + ctx->sam_ctx = samdb_connect(ctx, + ctx->event_ctx, + ctx->lp_ctx, + system_session(ctx->lp_ctx), + NULL, + 0); + } + + for (i=0; methods && methods[i] ; i++) { + struct auth_method_context *method; + + method = talloc(ctx, struct auth_method_context); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(method); + + method->ops = auth_backend_byname(methods[i]); + if (!method->ops) { + DEBUG(1,("auth_context_create: failed to find method=%s\n", + methods[i])); + return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + method->auth_ctx = ctx; + method->depth = i; + DLIST_ADD_END(ctx->methods, method); + } + + ctx->check_ntlm_password_send = auth_check_password_wrapper_send; + ctx->check_ntlm_password_recv = auth_check_password_wrapper_recv; + ctx->get_ntlm_challenge = auth_get_challenge; + ctx->set_ntlm_challenge = auth_context_set_challenge; + ctx->generate_session_info = auth_generate_session_info_wrapper; + ctx->generate_session_info_pac = auth_generate_session_info_pac; + + *auth_ctx = ctx; + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +const char **auth_methods_from_lp(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx) +{ + char **auth_methods = NULL; + + switch (lpcfg_server_role(lp_ctx)) { + case ROLE_STANDALONE: + auth_methods = str_list_make(mem_ctx, "anonymous sam_ignoredomain", NULL); + break; + case ROLE_DOMAIN_MEMBER: + case ROLE_DOMAIN_BDC: + case ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC: + case ROLE_ACTIVE_DIRECTORY_DC: + case ROLE_IPA_DC: + auth_methods = str_list_make(mem_ctx, "anonymous sam winbind sam_ignoredomain", NULL); + break; + } + return discard_const_p(const char *, auth_methods); +} + +/*************************************************************************** + Make a auth_info struct for the auth subsystem + - Uses default auth_methods, depending on server role and smb.conf settings +***************************************************************************/ +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth_context_create(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct tevent_context *ev, + struct imessaging_context *msg, + struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx, + struct auth4_context **auth_ctx) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + const char **auth_methods; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); + if (!tmp_ctx) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + auth_methods = auth_methods_from_lp(tmp_ctx, lp_ctx); + if (!auth_methods) { + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + status = auth_context_create_methods(mem_ctx, auth_methods, ev, msg, lp_ctx, NULL, auth_ctx); + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return status; +} + +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth_context_create_for_netlogon(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct tevent_context *ev, + struct imessaging_context *msg, + struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx, + struct auth4_context **auth_ctx) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + char **_auth_methods = NULL; + const char **auth_methods = NULL; + + /* + * Here we only allow 'sam winbind' instead of + * the 'anonymous sam winbind sam_ignoredomain' + * we typically use for authentication from clients. + */ + _auth_methods = str_list_make(mem_ctx, "sam winbind", NULL); + if (_auth_methods == NULL) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + auth_methods = discard_const_p(const char *, _auth_methods); + + status = auth_context_create_methods(mem_ctx, auth_methods, ev, msg, + lp_ctx, NULL, auth_ctx); + talloc_free(_auth_methods); + return status; +} + +/* the list of currently registered AUTH backends */ +static struct auth_backend { + const struct auth_operations *ops; +} *backends = NULL; +static int num_backends; + +/* + register a AUTH backend. + + The 'name' can be later used by other backends to find the operations + structure for this backend. +*/ +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth_register(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const struct auth_operations *ops) +{ + struct auth_operations *new_ops; + + if (auth_backend_byname(ops->name) != NULL) { + /* its already registered! */ + DEBUG(0,("AUTH backend '%s' already registered\n", + ops->name)); + return NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION; + } + + backends = talloc_realloc(mem_ctx, backends, + struct auth_backend, num_backends+1); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(backends); + + new_ops = (struct auth_operations *)talloc_memdup(backends, ops, sizeof(*ops)); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(new_ops); + new_ops->name = talloc_strdup(new_ops, ops->name); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(new_ops->name); + + backends[num_backends].ops = new_ops; + + num_backends++; + + DEBUG(3,("AUTH backend '%s' registered\n", + ops->name)); + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +/* + return the operations structure for a named backend of the specified type +*/ +const struct auth_operations *auth_backend_byname(const char *name) +{ + int i; + + for (i=0;i<num_backends;i++) { + if (strcmp(backends[i].ops->name, name) == 0) { + return backends[i].ops; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* + return the AUTH interface version, and the size of some critical types + This can be used by backends to either detect compilation errors, or provide + multiple implementations for different smbd compilation options in one module +*/ +const struct auth_critical_sizes *auth_interface_version(void) +{ + static const struct auth_critical_sizes critical_sizes = { + AUTH4_INTERFACE_VERSION, + sizeof(struct auth_operations), + sizeof(struct auth_method_context), + sizeof(struct auth4_context), + sizeof(struct auth_usersupplied_info), + sizeof(struct auth_user_info_dc) + }; + + return &critical_sizes; +} + +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth4_init(void) +{ + static bool initialized = false; +#define _MODULE_PROTO(init) extern NTSTATUS init(TALLOC_CTX *); + STATIC_auth4_MODULES_PROTO; + init_module_fn static_init[] = { STATIC_auth4_MODULES }; + + if (initialized) return NT_STATUS_OK; + initialized = true; + + run_init_functions(NULL, static_init); + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} diff --git a/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_anonymous.c b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_anonymous.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..328347a --- /dev/null +++ b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_anonymous.c @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +/* + Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + + Anonymous Authentication + + Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2004-2005 + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +*/ + +#include "includes.h" +#include <tevent.h> +#include "auth/auth.h" +#include "auth/ntlm/auth_proto.h" +#include "param/param.h" +#include "lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h" + +#undef DBGC_CLASS +#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH + +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth4_anonymous_init(TALLOC_CTX *); + +/** + * Return a anonymous logon for anonymous users (username = "") + * + * Typically used as the first module in the auth chain, this allows + * anonymou logons to be dealt with in one place. Non-anonymou logons 'fail' + * and pass onto the next module. + **/ +static NTSTATUS anonymous_want_check(struct auth_method_context *ctx, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info) +{ + if (user_info->client.account_name && *user_info->client.account_name) { + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + switch (user_info->password_state) { + case AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN: + if (user_info->password.plaintext != NULL && + strlen(user_info->password.plaintext) > 0) + { + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + break; + case AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH: + if (user_info->password.hash.lanman != NULL) { + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + if (user_info->password.hash.nt != NULL) { + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + break; + case AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE: + if (user_info->password.response.lanman.length == 1) { + if (user_info->password.response.lanman.data[0] != '\0') { + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + } else if (user_info->password.response.lanman.length > 1) { + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + if (user_info->password.response.nt.length > 0) { + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + break; + } + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +/** + * Return a anonymous logon for anonymous users (username = "") + * + * Typically used as the first module in the auth chain, this allows + * anonymou logons to be dealt with in one place. Non-anonymou logons 'fail' + * and pass onto the next module. + **/ + +struct anonymous_check_password_state { + struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc; +}; + +static struct tevent_req *anonymous_check_password_send( + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct tevent_context *ev, + struct auth_method_context *ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info) +{ + struct tevent_req *req = NULL; + struct anonymous_check_password_state *state = NULL; + NTSTATUS status; + + req = tevent_req_create( + mem_ctx, + &state, + struct anonymous_check_password_state); + if (req == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + status = auth_anonymous_user_info_dc( + state, + lpcfg_netbios_name(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx), + &state->user_info_dc); + if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) { + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + tevent_req_done(req); + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); +} + +static NTSTATUS anonymous_check_password_recv( + struct tevent_req *req, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct auth_user_info_dc **interim_info, + const struct authn_audit_info **client_audit_info, + const struct authn_audit_info **server_audit_info, + bool *authoritative) +{ + struct anonymous_check_password_state *state = tevent_req_data( + req, struct anonymous_check_password_state); + NTSTATUS status; + + *client_audit_info = NULL; + *server_audit_info = NULL; + + if (tevent_req_is_nterror(req, &status)) { + tevent_req_received(req); + return status; + } + *interim_info = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &state->user_info_dc); + tevent_req_received(req); + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + + +static const struct auth_operations anonymous_auth_ops = { + .name = "anonymous", + .want_check = anonymous_want_check, + .check_password_send = anonymous_check_password_send, + .check_password_recv = anonymous_check_password_recv, +}; + +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth4_anonymous_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx) +{ + NTSTATUS ret; + + ret = auth_register(ctx, &anonymous_auth_ops); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) { + DEBUG(0,("Failed to register 'anonymous' auth backend!\n")); + return ret; + } + + return ret; +} diff --git a/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_developer.c b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_developer.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..89db15d --- /dev/null +++ b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_developer.c @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +/* + Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + Generic authentication types + Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001-2002 + Copyright (C) Jelmer Vernooij 2002 + Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2005 + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +*/ + +#include "includes.h" +#include <tevent.h> +#include "auth/auth.h" +#include "auth/ntlm/auth_proto.h" +#include "libcli/security/security.h" +#include "lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h" + +#undef DBGC_CLASS +#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH + +#undef strncasecmp + +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth4_developer_init(TALLOC_CTX *); + +static NTSTATUS name_to_ntstatus_want_check(struct auth_method_context *ctx, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info) +{ + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +/** + * Return an error based on username + * + * This function allows the testing of obscure errors, as well as the generation + * of NT_STATUS -> DOS error mapping tables. + * + * This module is of no value to end-users. + * + * The password is ignored. + * + * @return An NTSTATUS value based on the username + **/ + +static NTSTATUS name_to_ntstatus_check_password(struct auth_method_context *ctx, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, + struct auth_user_info_dc **_user_info_dc, + bool *authoritative) +{ + NTSTATUS nt_status; + struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc; + struct auth_user_info *info; + uint32_t error_num; + const char *user; + + user = user_info->client.account_name; + + if (strncasecmp("NT_STATUS", user, strlen("NT_STATUS")) == 0) { + nt_status = nt_status_string_to_code(user); + } else { + error_num = strtoul(user, NULL, 16); + DEBUG(5,("name_to_ntstatus_check_password: Error for user %s was 0x%08X\n", user, error_num)); + nt_status = NT_STATUS(error_num); + } + NT_STATUS_NOT_OK_RETURN(nt_status); + + user_info_dc = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct auth_user_info_dc); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(user_info_dc); + + /* This returns a pointer to a struct dom_sid, which is the + * same as a 1 element list of struct dom_sid */ + user_info_dc->num_sids = 1; + user_info_dc->sids = talloc(user_info_dc, struct auth_SidAttr); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(user_info_dc->sids); + + user_info_dc->sids->sid = global_sid_Anonymous; + user_info_dc->sids->attrs = SE_GROUP_DEFAULT_FLAGS; + + /* annoying, but the Anonymous really does have a session key, + and it is all zeros! */ + user_info_dc->user_session_key = data_blob_talloc(user_info_dc, NULL, 16); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(user_info_dc->user_session_key.data); + + user_info_dc->lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(user_info_dc, NULL, 16); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(user_info_dc->lm_session_key.data); + + data_blob_clear(&user_info_dc->user_session_key); + data_blob_clear(&user_info_dc->lm_session_key); + + user_info_dc->info = info = talloc_zero(user_info_dc, struct auth_user_info); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(user_info_dc->info); + + info->account_name = talloc_asprintf(user_info_dc, "NAME TO NTSTATUS %s ANONYMOUS LOGON", user); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(info->account_name); + + info->domain_name = talloc_strdup(user_info_dc, "NT AUTHORITY"); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(info->domain_name); + + info->full_name = talloc_asprintf(user_info_dc, "NAME TO NTSTATUS %s Anonymous Logon", user); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(info->full_name); + + info->logon_script = talloc_strdup(user_info_dc, ""); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(info->logon_script); + + info->profile_path = talloc_strdup(user_info_dc, ""); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(info->profile_path); + + info->home_directory = talloc_strdup(user_info_dc, ""); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(info->home_directory); + + info->home_drive = talloc_strdup(user_info_dc, ""); + NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(info->home_drive); + + info->last_logon = 0; + info->last_logoff = 0; + info->acct_expiry = 0; + info->last_password_change = 0; + info->allow_password_change = 0; + info->force_password_change = 0; + + info->logon_count = 0; + info->bad_password_count = 0; + + info->acct_flags = ACB_NORMAL; + + info->user_flags = 0; + + *_user_info_dc = user_info_dc; + + return nt_status; +} + +struct name_to_ntstatus_check_password_state { + struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc; + bool authoritative; +}; + +static struct tevent_req *name_to_ntstatus_check_password_send( + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct tevent_context *ev, + struct auth_method_context *ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info) +{ + struct tevent_req *req = NULL; + struct name_to_ntstatus_check_password_state *state = NULL; + NTSTATUS status; + + req = tevent_req_create( + mem_ctx, + &state, + struct name_to_ntstatus_check_password_state); + if (req == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + status = name_to_ntstatus_check_password( + ctx, + state, + user_info, + &state->user_info_dc, + &state->authoritative); + if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) { + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + tevent_req_done(req); + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); +} + +static NTSTATUS name_to_ntstatus_check_password_recv( + struct tevent_req *req, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct auth_user_info_dc **interim_info, + const struct authn_audit_info **client_audit_info, + const struct authn_audit_info **server_audit_info, + bool *authoritative) +{ + struct name_to_ntstatus_check_password_state *state = tevent_req_data( + req, struct name_to_ntstatus_check_password_state); + NTSTATUS status; + + *authoritative = state->authoritative; + *client_audit_info = NULL; + *server_audit_info = NULL; + + if (tevent_req_is_nterror(req, &status)) { + tevent_req_received(req); + return status; + } + *interim_info = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &state->user_info_dc); + tevent_req_received(req); + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +static const struct auth_operations name_to_ntstatus_auth_ops = { + .name = "name_to_ntstatus", + .want_check = name_to_ntstatus_want_check, + .check_password_send = name_to_ntstatus_check_password_send, + .check_password_recv = name_to_ntstatus_check_password_recv, +}; + +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth4_developer_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx) +{ + NTSTATUS ret; + + ret = auth_register(ctx, &name_to_ntstatus_auth_ops); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) { + DEBUG(0,("Failed to register 'name_to_ntstatus' auth backend!\n")); + return ret; + } + + return ret; +} diff --git a/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_sam.c b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_sam.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d12045d --- /dev/null +++ b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_sam.c @@ -0,0 +1,1417 @@ +/* + Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + Password and authentication handling + Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2001-2009 + Copyright (C) Gerald Carter 2003 + Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2005-2010 + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +*/ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "system/time.h" +#include <ldb.h> +#include "libcli/ldap/ldap_ndr.h" +#include "libcli/security/security.h" +#include "auth/auth.h" +#include "../libcli/auth/ntlm_check.h" +#include "auth/ntlm/auth_proto.h" +#include "auth/auth_sam.h" +#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h" +#include "dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/util.h" +#include "dsdb/common/util.h" +#include "param/param.h" +#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_irpc_c.h" +#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_winbind_c.h" +#include "lib/messaging/irpc.h" +#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h" +#include "libds/common/roles.h" +#include "lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h" +#include "system/kerberos.h" +#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h" +#include "kdc/authn_policy_util.h" +#include "kdc/db-glue.h" + +#undef DBGC_CLASS +#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH + +NTSTATUS auth_sam_init(void); + +extern const char *user_attrs[]; +extern const char *domain_ref_attrs[]; + +/**************************************************************************** + Do a specific test for an smb password being correct, given a smb_password and + the lanman and NT responses. +****************************************************************************/ +static NTSTATUS authsam_password_ok(struct auth4_context *auth_context, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const struct samr_Password *nt_pwd, + struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context, + const DATA_BLOB *stored_aes_256_key, + const krb5_data *salt, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, + DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key, + DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + + switch (user_info->password_state) { + case AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN: + { + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info_temp; + + if (nt_pwd == NULL && stored_aes_256_key != NULL && user_info->password.plaintext != NULL) { + bool pw_equal; + int krb5_ret; + DATA_BLOB supplied_aes_256_key; + krb5_keyblock key; + krb5_data cleartext_data = { + .data = user_info->password.plaintext, + .length = strlen(user_info->password.plaintext) + }; + + *lm_sess_key = data_blob_null; + *user_sess_key = data_blob_null; + + krb5_ret = smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, + NULL, + salt, + &cleartext_data, + ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, + &key); + if (krb5_ret) { + DBG_ERR("generation of a aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 key for password comparison failed: %s\n", + smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, + krb5_ret, mem_ctx)); + return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + supplied_aes_256_key = data_blob_const(KRB5_KEY_DATA(&key), + KRB5_KEY_LENGTH(&key)); + + pw_equal = data_blob_equal_const_time(&supplied_aes_256_key, + stored_aes_256_key); + + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &key); + if (!pw_equal) { + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + status = encrypt_user_info(mem_ctx, auth_context, + AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH, + user_info, &user_info_temp); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + DEBUG(1, ("Failed to convert plaintext password to password HASH: %s\n", nt_errstr(status))); + return status; + } + user_info = user_info_temp; + + FALL_THROUGH; + } + case AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH: + *lm_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0); + *user_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0); + status = hash_password_check(mem_ctx, + false, + lpcfg_ntlm_auth(auth_context->lp_ctx), + NULL, + user_info->password.hash.nt, + user_info->mapped.account_name, + NULL, nt_pwd); + NT_STATUS_NOT_OK_RETURN(status); + break; + + case AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE: + status = ntlm_password_check(mem_ctx, + false, + lpcfg_ntlm_auth(auth_context->lp_ctx), + user_info->logon_parameters, + &auth_context->challenge.data, + &user_info->password.response.lanman, + &user_info->password.response.nt, + user_info->mapped.account_name, + user_info->client.account_name, + user_info->client.domain_name, + NULL, nt_pwd, + user_sess_key, lm_sess_key); + NT_STATUS_NOT_OK_RETURN(status); + break; + } + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +static void auth_sam_trigger_zero_password(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx, + struct tevent_context *event_ctx, + struct netr_SendToSamBase *send_to_sam) +{ + struct dcerpc_binding_handle *irpc_handle; + struct winbind_SendToSam r; + struct tevent_req *req; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx; + + tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); + if (tmp_ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + irpc_handle = irpc_binding_handle_by_name(tmp_ctx, msg_ctx, + "winbind_server", + &ndr_table_winbind); + if (irpc_handle == NULL) { + DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Unable to get binding handle for winbind\n")); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return; + } + + r.in.message = *send_to_sam; + + /* + * This seem to rely on the current IRPC implementation, + * which delivers the message in the _send function. + * + * TODO: we need a ONE_WAY IRPC handle and register + * a callback and wait for it to be triggered! + */ + req = dcerpc_winbind_SendToSam_r_send(tmp_ctx, + event_ctx, + irpc_handle, + &r); + + /* we aren't interested in a reply */ + talloc_free(req); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + +} + +/* + send a message to the drepl server telling it to initiate a + REPL_SECRET getncchanges extended op to fetch the users secrets + */ +static void auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx, + struct tevent_context *event_ctx, + struct ldb_dn *user_dn) +{ + struct dcerpc_binding_handle *irpc_handle; + struct drepl_trigger_repl_secret r; + struct tevent_req *req; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx; + + tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); + if (tmp_ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + irpc_handle = irpc_binding_handle_by_name(tmp_ctx, msg_ctx, + "dreplsrv", + &ndr_table_irpc); + if (irpc_handle == NULL) { + DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Unable to get binding handle for dreplsrv\n")); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return; + } + + r.in.user_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(user_dn); + + /* + * This seem to rely on the current IRPC implementation, + * which delivers the message in the _send function. + * + * TODO: we need a ONE_WAY IRPC handle and register + * a callback and wait for it to be triggered! + */ + req = dcerpc_drepl_trigger_repl_secret_r_send(tmp_ctx, + event_ctx, + irpc_handle, + &r); + + /* we aren't interested in a reply */ + talloc_free(req); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); +} + +static const struct samr_Password *hide_invalid_nthash(const struct samr_Password *in) +{ + /* + * This is the result of: + * + * E_md4hash("", zero_string_hash.hash); + */ + static const struct samr_Password zero_string_hash = { + .hash = { + 0x31, 0xd6, 0xcf, 0xe0, 0xd1, 0x6a, 0xe9, 0x31, + 0xb7, 0x3c, 0x59, 0xd7, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x89, 0xc0, + } + }; + + if (in == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Skip over any all-zero hashes in the history. No known software + * stores these but just to be sure + */ + if (all_zero(in->hash, sizeof(in->hash))) { + return NULL; + } + + /* + * This looks odd, but the password_hash module in the past has written + * this in the rare situation where (somehow) we didn't have an old NT + * hash (one of the old LM-only set paths) + * + * mem_equal_const_time() is used to avoid a timing attack + * when comparing secret data in the server with this constant + * value. + */ + if (mem_equal_const_time(in->hash, zero_string_hash.hash, 16)) { + in = NULL; + } + + return in; +} + +/* + * Check that a password is OK, and update badPwdCount if required. + */ + +static NTSTATUS authsam_password_check_and_record(struct auth4_context *auth_context, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct ldb_dn *domain_dn, + struct ldb_message *msg, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, + DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key, + DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key, + bool *authoritative) +{ + NTSTATUS nt_status; + NTSTATUS auth_status; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx; + int i, ret; + int history_len = 0; + struct ldb_context *sam_ctx = auth_context->sam_ctx; + const char * const attrs[] = { "pwdHistoryLength", NULL }; + struct ldb_message *dom_msg; + struct samr_Password *nt_pwd; + DATA_BLOB _aes_256_key = data_blob_null; + DATA_BLOB *aes_256_key = NULL; + krb5_data _salt = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + krb5_data *salt = NULL; + DATA_BLOB salt_data = data_blob_null; + struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context = NULL; + const struct ldb_val *sc_val; + uint32_t userAccountControl = 0; + uint32_t current_kvno = 0; + bool am_rodc; + + tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); + if (tmp_ctx == NULL) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + /* + * This call does more than what it appears to do, it also + * checks for the account lockout. + * + * It is done here so that all parts of Samba that read the + * password refuse to even operate on it if the account is + * locked out, to avoid mistakes like CVE-2013-4496. + */ + nt_status = samdb_result_passwords(tmp_ctx, auth_context->lp_ctx, + msg, &nt_pwd); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; + } + + userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, + "userAccountControl", + 0); + + sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials"); + + if (nt_pwd == NULL && sc_val == NULL) { + if (samdb_rodc(auth_context->sam_ctx, &am_rodc) == LDB_SUCCESS && am_rodc) { + /* + * we don't have passwords for this + * account. We are an RODC, and this account + * may be one for which we either are denied + * REPL_SECRET replication or we haven't yet + * done the replication. We return + * NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED which tells the + * auth code to try the next authentication + * mechanism. We also send a message to our + * drepl server to tell it to try and + * replicate the secrets for this account. + * + * TODO: Should we only trigger this is detected + * there's a chance that the password might be + * replicated, we should be able to detect this + * based on msDS-NeverRevealGroup. + */ + auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(auth_context, + auth_context->msg_ctx, + auth_context->event_ctx, + msg->dn); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + } + + /* + * If we don't have an NT password, pull a kerberos key + * instead for plaintext. + */ + if (nt_pwd == NULL && + sc_val != NULL && + user_info->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN) + { + krb5_error_code krb5_ret; + + krb5_ret = smb_krb5_init_context(tmp_ctx, + auth_context->lp_ctx, + &smb_krb5_context); + if (krb5_ret != 0) { + DBG_ERR("Failed to setup krb5_context: %s!\n", + error_message(krb5_ret)); + return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* + * Get the current salt from the record + */ + + krb5_ret = dsdb_extract_aes_256_key(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, + tmp_ctx, + msg, + userAccountControl, + NULL, /* kvno */ + ¤t_kvno, /* kvno_out */ + &_aes_256_key, + &salt_data); + if (krb5_ret == 0) { + aes_256_key = &_aes_256_key; + + _salt.data = (char *)salt_data.data; + _salt.length = salt_data.length; + salt = &_salt; + } + } + + auth_status = authsam_password_ok(auth_context, + tmp_ctx, + nt_pwd, + smb_krb5_context, + aes_256_key, + salt, + user_info, + user_sess_key, lm_sess_key); + + if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(auth_status)) { + if (user_sess_key->data) { + talloc_steal(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data); + } + if (lm_sess_key->data) { + talloc_steal(mem_ctx, lm_sess_key->data); + } + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + *user_sess_key = data_blob_null; + *lm_sess_key = data_blob_null; + + if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(auth_status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD)) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return auth_status; + } + + /* + * We only continue if this was a wrong password + * and we'll always return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD + * no matter what error happens. + */ + + /* pull the domain password property attributes */ + ret = dsdb_search_one(sam_ctx, tmp_ctx, &dom_msg, domain_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE, + attrs, 0, "objectClass=domain"); + if (ret == LDB_SUCCESS) { + history_len = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(dom_msg, "pwdHistoryLength", 0); + } else if (ret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) { + DEBUG(3,("Couldn't find domain %s: %s!\n", + ldb_dn_get_linearized(domain_dn), + ldb_errstring(sam_ctx))); + } else { + DEBUG(3,("error finding domain %s: %s!\n", + ldb_dn_get_linearized(domain_dn), + ldb_errstring(sam_ctx))); + } + + for (i = 1; i < MIN(history_len, 3); i++) { + const struct samr_Password *nt_history_pwd = NULL; + NTTIME pwdLastSet; + struct timeval tv_now; + NTTIME now; + int allowed_period_mins; + NTTIME allowed_period; + + /* Reset these variables back to starting as empty */ + aes_256_key = NULL; + salt = NULL; + + /* + * Obtain the i'th old password from the NT password + * history for this user. + * + * We avoid issues with salts (which are not + * recorded for historical AES256 keys) by using the + * ntPwdHistory in preference. + */ + nt_status = samdb_result_passwords_from_history(tmp_ctx, + auth_context->lp_ctx, + msg, i, + NULL, + &nt_history_pwd); + + /* + * Belts and braces: note that + * samdb_result_passwords_from_history() currently + * does not fail for missing attributes, it only sets + * nt_history_pwd = NULL, so "break" and fall down to + * the bad password count update if this happens + */ + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + break; + } + + nt_history_pwd = hide_invalid_nthash(nt_history_pwd); + + /* + * We don't have an NT hash from the + * ntPwdHistory, but we can still perform the + * password check with the AES256 + * key. + * + * However, this is the second preference as + * it will fail if the account was renamed + * prior to a password change (as we won't + * have the correct salt available to + * calculate the AES256 key). + */ + + if (nt_history_pwd == NULL && sc_val != NULL && + user_info->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN && + current_kvno >= i) + { + krb5_error_code krb5_ret; + const uint32_t request_kvno = current_kvno - i; + + /* + * Confirm we have a krb5_context set up + */ + if (smb_krb5_context == NULL) { + /* + * We get here if we had a unicodePwd + * for the current password, no + * ntPwdHistory, a valid previous + * Kerberos history AND are processing + * a simple bind. + * + * This really is a corner case so + * favour cleaner code over trying to + * allow for an old password. It is + * more likely this is just a new + * account. + * + * "break" out of the loop and fall down + * to the bad password update + */ + break; + } + + /* + * Get the current salt from the record + */ + + krb5_ret = dsdb_extract_aes_256_key(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, + tmp_ctx, + msg, + userAccountControl, + &request_kvno, /* kvno */ + NULL, /* kvno_out */ + &_aes_256_key, + &salt_data); + if (krb5_ret != 0) { + break; + } + + aes_256_key = &_aes_256_key; + + _salt.data = (char *)salt_data.data; + _salt.length = salt_data.length; + salt = &_salt; + + } else if (nt_history_pwd == NULL) { + /* + * If we don't find element 'i' in the + * ntPwdHistory and can not fall back to the + * kerberos hash, we won't find 'i+1' ... + */ + break; + } + + auth_status = authsam_password_ok(auth_context, tmp_ctx, + nt_history_pwd, + smb_krb5_context, + aes_256_key, + salt, + user_info, + user_sess_key, + lm_sess_key); + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(auth_status)) { + /* + * If this was not a correct password, try the next + * one from the history + */ + *user_sess_key = data_blob_null; + *lm_sess_key = data_blob_null; + continue; + } + + if (i != 1) { + /* + * The authentication was OK, but not against + * the previous password, which is stored at index 1. + * + * We just return the original wrong password. + * This skips the update of the bad pwd count, + * because this is almost certainly user error + * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached + * password from before the password change), + * not an attack. + */ + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + + if (user_info->flags & USER_INFO_INTERACTIVE_LOGON) { + /* + * The authentication was OK against the previous password, + * but it's not a NTLM network authentication, + * LDAP simple bind or something similar. + * + * We just return the original wrong password. + * This skips the update of the bad pwd count, + * because this is almost certainly user error + * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached + * password from before the password change), + * not an attack. + */ + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + + /* + * If the password was OK, it's a NTLM network authentication + * and it was the previous password. + * + * Now we see if it is within the grace period, + * so that we don't break cached sessions on other computers + * before the user can lock and unlock their other screens + * (resetting their cached password). + * + * See http://support.microsoft.com/kb/906305 + * OldPasswordAllowedPeriod ("old password allowed period") + * is specified in minutes. The default is 60. + */ + allowed_period_mins = lpcfg_old_password_allowed_period(auth_context->lp_ctx); + /* + * NTTIME uses 100ns units + */ + allowed_period = (NTTIME) allowed_period_mins * + 60 * 1000*1000*10; + pwdLastSet = samdb_result_nttime(msg, "pwdLastSet", 0); + tv_now = timeval_current(); + now = timeval_to_nttime(&tv_now); + + if (now < pwdLastSet) { + /* + * time jump? + * + * We just return the original wrong password. + * This skips the update of the bad pwd count, + * because this is almost certainly user error + * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached + * password from before the password change), + * not an attack. + */ + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + + if ((now - pwdLastSet) >= allowed_period) { + /* + * The allowed period is over. + * + * We just return the original wrong password. + * This skips the update of the bad pwd count, + * because this is almost certainly user error + * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached + * password from before the password change), + * not an attack. + */ + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + + /* + * We finally allow the authentication with the + * previous password within the allowed period. + */ + if (user_sess_key->data) { + talloc_steal(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data); + } + if (lm_sess_key->data) { + talloc_steal(mem_ctx, lm_sess_key->data); + } + + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return auth_status; + } + + /* + * If we are not in the allowed period or match an old password, + * we didn't return early. Now update the badPwdCount et al. + */ + nt_status = authsam_update_bad_pwd_count(auth_context->sam_ctx, + msg, domain_dn); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + /* + * We need to return the original + * NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD error, so there isn't + * anything more we can do than write something into + * the log + */ + DEBUG(0, ("Failed to note bad password for user [%s]: %s\n", + user_info->mapped.account_name, + nt_errstr(nt_status))); + } + + if (samdb_rodc(auth_context->sam_ctx, &am_rodc) == LDB_SUCCESS && am_rodc) { + *authoritative = false; + } + + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + + if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + nt_status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + return nt_status; +} + +static NTSTATUS authsam_check_netlogon_trust(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct ldb_context *sam_ctx, + struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, + const struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc, + struct authn_audit_info **server_audit_info_out) +{ + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = NULL; + + static const char *authn_policy_silo_attrs[] = { + "msDS-AssignedAuthNPolicy", + "msDS-AssignedAuthNPolicySilo", + "objectClass", /* used to determine which set of policy + * attributes apply. */ + NULL, + }; + + const struct authn_server_policy *authn_server_policy = NULL; + + struct dom_sid_buf netlogon_trust_sid_buf; + const char *netlogon_trust_sid_str = NULL; + struct ldb_dn *netlogon_trust_dn = NULL; + struct ldb_message *netlogon_trust_msg = NULL; + + int ret; + + /* Have we established a secure channel? */ + if (user_info->netlogon_trust_account.secure_channel_type == SEC_CHAN_NULL) { + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + if (!authn_policy_silos_and_policies_in_effect(sam_ctx)) { + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + /* + * We have established a secure channel, and we should have the machine + * account’s SID. + */ + SMB_ASSERT(user_info->netlogon_trust_account.sid != NULL); + + tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); + if (tmp_ctx == NULL) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + netlogon_trust_sid_str = dom_sid_str_buf(user_info->netlogon_trust_account.sid, + &netlogon_trust_sid_buf); + + netlogon_trust_dn = ldb_dn_new_fmt(tmp_ctx, sam_ctx, + "<SID=%s>", + netlogon_trust_sid_str); + if (netlogon_trust_dn == NULL) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + /* + * Look up the machine account to see if it has an applicable + * authentication policy. + */ + ret = dsdb_search_one(sam_ctx, + tmp_ctx, + &netlogon_trust_msg, + netlogon_trust_dn, + LDB_SCOPE_BASE, + authn_policy_silo_attrs, + 0, + NULL); + if (ret) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return dsdb_ldb_err_to_ntstatus(ret); + } + + ret = authn_policy_server(sam_ctx, + tmp_ctx, + netlogon_trust_msg, + &authn_server_policy); + if (ret) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + if (authn_server_policy != NULL) { + struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info = NULL; + NTSTATUS status; + + /* + * An authentication policy applies to the machine + * account. Carry out the access check. + */ + status = authn_policy_authenticate_to_service(tmp_ctx, + sam_ctx, + lp_ctx, + AUTHN_POLICY_AUTH_TYPE_NTLM, + user_info_dc, + NULL /* device_info */, + /* + * It seems that claims go ignored for + * SamLogon (see SamLogonTests — + * test_samlogon_allowed_to_computer_silo). + */ + (struct auth_claims) {}, + authn_server_policy, + (struct authn_policy_flags) {}, + &server_audit_info); + if (server_audit_info != NULL) { + *server_audit_info_out = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &server_audit_info); + } + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return status; + } + } + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +static NTSTATUS authsam_authenticate(struct auth4_context *auth_context, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct ldb_dn *domain_dn, + struct ldb_message *msg, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, + const struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc, + DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key, DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key, + struct authn_audit_info **client_audit_info_out, + struct authn_audit_info **server_audit_info_out, + bool *authoritative) +{ + NTSTATUS nt_status; + int ret; + bool interactive = (user_info->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH); + uint32_t acct_flags = samdb_result_acct_flags(msg, NULL); + struct netr_SendToSamBase *send_to_sam = NULL; + const struct authn_ntlm_client_policy *authn_client_policy = NULL; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); + if (!tmp_ctx) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + /* You can only do an interactive login to normal accounts */ + if (user_info->flags & USER_INFO_INTERACTIVE_LOGON) { + if (!(acct_flags & ACB_NORMAL)) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER; + } + if (acct_flags & ACB_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) { + if (acct_flags & ACB_DISABLED) { + DEBUG(2,("authsam_authenticate: Account for user '%s' " + "was disabled.\n", + user_info->mapped.account_name)); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED; + } + DEBUG(2,("authsam_authenticate: Account for user '%s' " + "requires interactive smartcard logon.\n", + user_info->mapped.account_name)); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_SMARTCARD_LOGON_REQUIRED; + } + } + + /* See whether an authentication policy applies to the client. */ + ret = authn_policy_ntlm_client(auth_context->sam_ctx, + tmp_ctx, + msg, + &authn_client_policy); + if (ret) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + nt_status = authn_policy_ntlm_apply_device_restriction(mem_ctx, + authn_client_policy, + client_audit_info_out); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + /* + * As we didn’t get far enough to check the server policy, only + * the client policy will be referenced in the authentication + * log message. + */ + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; + } + + nt_status = authsam_password_check_and_record(auth_context, tmp_ctx, + domain_dn, msg, + user_info, + user_sess_key, lm_sess_key, + authoritative); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; + } + + nt_status = authsam_check_netlogon_trust(mem_ctx, + auth_context->sam_ctx, + auth_context->lp_ctx, + user_info, + user_info_dc, + server_audit_info_out); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; + } + + nt_status = authsam_account_ok(tmp_ctx, auth_context->sam_ctx, + user_info->logon_parameters, + domain_dn, + msg, + user_info->workstation_name, + user_info->mapped.account_name, + false, false); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; + } + + nt_status = authsam_logon_success_accounting(auth_context->sam_ctx, + msg, domain_dn, + interactive, + tmp_ctx, + &send_to_sam); + + if (send_to_sam != NULL) { + auth_sam_trigger_zero_password(tmp_ctx, + auth_context->msg_ctx, + auth_context->event_ctx, + send_to_sam); + } + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; + } + + if (user_sess_key && user_sess_key->data) { + talloc_steal(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data); + } + if (lm_sess_key && lm_sess_key->data) { + talloc_steal(mem_ctx, lm_sess_key->data); + } + + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; +} + + + +static NTSTATUS authsam_check_password_internals(struct auth_method_context *ctx, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, + struct auth_user_info_dc **user_info_dc, + struct authn_audit_info **client_audit_info_out, + struct authn_audit_info **server_audit_info_out, + bool *authoritative) +{ + NTSTATUS nt_status; + int result; + const char *account_name = user_info->mapped.account_name; + struct ldb_message *msg; + struct ldb_dn *domain_dn; + DATA_BLOB user_sess_key, lm_sess_key; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx; + const char *p = NULL; + struct auth_user_info_dc *reparented = NULL; + struct authn_audit_info *client_audit_info = NULL; + struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info = NULL; + + if (ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx == NULL) { + DEBUG(0, ("No SAM available, cannot log in users\n")); + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE; + } + + if (!account_name || !*account_name) { + /* 'not for me' */ + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); + if (!tmp_ctx) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + domain_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx); + if (domain_dn == NULL) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN; + } + + /* + * If we have not already mapped this user, then now is a good + * time to do so, before we look it up. We used to do this + * earlier, but in a multi-forest environment we want to do + * this mapping at the final domain. + * + * However, on the flip side we may have already mapped the + * user if this was an LDAP simple bind, in which case we + * really, really want to get back to exactly the same account + * we got the DN for. + */ + if (!user_info->cracknames_called) { + p = strchr_m(account_name, '@'); + } else { + /* + * This is slightly nicer than double-indenting the + * block below + */ + p = NULL; + } + + if (p != NULL) { + const char *nt4_domain = NULL; + const char *nt4_account = NULL; + bool is_my_domain = false; + + nt_status = crack_name_to_nt4_name(mem_ctx, + ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, + /* + * DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_UPN_FOR_LOGON ? + */ + DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_USER_PRINCIPAL, + account_name, + &nt4_domain, &nt4_account); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER; + } + + is_my_domain = lpcfg_is_mydomain(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx, nt4_domain); + if (!is_my_domain) { + /* + * This is a user within our forest, + * but in a different domain, + * we're not authoritative + */ + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + /* + * Let's use the NT4 account name for the lookup. + */ + account_name = nt4_account; + } + + nt_status = authsam_search_account(tmp_ctx, ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, account_name, domain_dn, &msg); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; + } + + nt_status = authsam_make_user_info_dc(tmp_ctx, ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, + lpcfg_netbios_name(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx), + lpcfg_sam_name(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx), + lpcfg_sam_dnsname(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx), + domain_dn, + msg, + data_blob_null, data_blob_null, + user_info_dc); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; + } + + result = dsdb_is_protected_user(ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, + (*user_info_dc)->sids, + (*user_info_dc)->num_sids); + /* + * We also consider an error result (a negative value) as denying the + * authentication. + */ + if (result != 0) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_RESTRICTION; + } + + nt_status = authsam_authenticate(ctx->auth_ctx, + tmp_ctx, + domain_dn, + msg, + user_info, + *user_info_dc, + &user_sess_key, + &lm_sess_key, + &client_audit_info, + &server_audit_info, + authoritative); + if (client_audit_info != NULL) { + *client_audit_info_out = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &client_audit_info); + } + if (server_audit_info != NULL) { + *server_audit_info_out = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &server_audit_info); + } + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return nt_status; + } + + (*user_info_dc)->user_session_key = data_blob_talloc(*user_info_dc, + user_sess_key.data, + user_sess_key.length); + if (user_sess_key.data) { + if ((*user_info_dc)->user_session_key.data == NULL) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + } + + (*user_info_dc)->lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(*user_info_dc, + lm_sess_key.data, + lm_sess_key.length); + if (lm_sess_key.data) { + if ((*user_info_dc)->lm_session_key.data == NULL) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + } + + /* + * Release our handle to *user_info_dc. {client,server}_audit_info_out, + * if non-NULL, becomes the new parent. + */ + reparented = talloc_reparent(tmp_ctx, mem_ctx, *user_info_dc); + if (reparented == NULL) { + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +struct authsam_check_password_state { + struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc; + struct authn_audit_info *client_audit_info; + struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info; + bool authoritative; +}; + +static struct tevent_req *authsam_check_password_send( + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct tevent_context *ev, + struct auth_method_context *ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info) +{ + struct tevent_req *req = NULL; + struct authsam_check_password_state *state = NULL; + NTSTATUS status; + + req = tevent_req_create( + mem_ctx, &state, struct authsam_check_password_state); + if (req == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + /* + * authsam_check_password_internals() sets this to false in + * the rodc case, otherwise it leaves it untouched. Default to + * "we're authoritative". + */ + state->authoritative = true; + + status = authsam_check_password_internals( + ctx, + state, + user_info, + &state->user_info_dc, + &state->client_audit_info, + &state->server_audit_info, + &state->authoritative); + if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) { + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + + tevent_req_done(req); + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); +} + +static NTSTATUS authsam_check_password_recv( + struct tevent_req *req, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct auth_user_info_dc **interim_info, + const struct authn_audit_info **client_audit_info, + const struct authn_audit_info **server_audit_info, + bool *authoritative) +{ + struct authsam_check_password_state *state = tevent_req_data( + req, struct authsam_check_password_state); + NTSTATUS status; + + *authoritative = state->authoritative; + + *client_audit_info = talloc_reparent(state, mem_ctx, state->client_audit_info); + state->client_audit_info = NULL; + + *server_audit_info = talloc_reparent(state, mem_ctx, state->server_audit_info); + state->server_audit_info = NULL; + + if (tevent_req_is_nterror(req, &status)) { + tevent_req_received(req); + return status; + } + /* + * Release our handle to state->user_info_dc. + * {client,server}_audit_info, if non-NULL, becomes the new parent. + */ + *interim_info = talloc_reparent(state, mem_ctx, state->user_info_dc); + state->user_info_dc = NULL; + + tevent_req_received(req); + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +static NTSTATUS authsam_ignoredomain_want_check(struct auth_method_context *ctx, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info) +{ + if (!user_info->mapped.account_name || !*user_info->mapped.account_name) { + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +/**************************************************************************** +Check SAM security (above) but with a few extra checks. +****************************************************************************/ +static NTSTATUS authsam_want_check(struct auth_method_context *ctx, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info) +{ + const char *effective_domain = user_info->mapped.domain_name; + bool is_local_name = false; + bool is_my_domain = false; + const char *p = NULL; + struct dsdb_trust_routing_table *trt = NULL; + const struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx *tdo = NULL; + NTSTATUS status; + + if (!user_info->mapped.account_name || !*user_info->mapped.account_name) { + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + if (effective_domain == NULL) { + effective_domain = ""; + } + + is_local_name = lpcfg_is_myname(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx, + effective_domain); + + /* check whether or not we service this domain/workgroup name */ + switch (lpcfg_server_role(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx)) { + case ROLE_STANDALONE: + return NT_STATUS_OK; + + case ROLE_DOMAIN_MEMBER: + if (is_local_name) { + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + DBG_DEBUG("%s is not one of my local names (DOMAIN_MEMBER)\n", + effective_domain); + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + + case ROLE_ACTIVE_DIRECTORY_DC: + /* handled later */ + break; + + default: + DBG_ERR("lpcfg_server_role() has an undefined value\n"); + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SERVER_STATE; + } + + /* + * Now we handle the AD DC case... + */ + + is_my_domain = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx, + effective_domain); + if (is_my_domain) { + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + if (user_info->cracknames_called) { + /* + * The caller already did a cracknames call. + */ + DBG_DEBUG("%s is not own domain name (DC)\n", + effective_domain); + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + if (!strequal(effective_domain, "")) { + DBG_DEBUG("%s is not own domain name (DC)\n", + effective_domain); + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + p = strchr_m(user_info->mapped.account_name, '@'); + if (p == NULL) { + /* + * An empty to domain name should be handled + * as the local domain name. + */ + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + effective_domain = p + 1; + is_my_domain = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx, + effective_domain); + if (is_my_domain) { + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + if (strequal(effective_domain, "")) { + DBG_DEBUG("authsam_check_password: upn without realm (DC)\n"); + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + /* + * as last option we check the routing table if the + * domain is within our forest. + */ + status = dsdb_trust_routing_table_load(ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, + mem_ctx, &trt); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + DBG_ERR("authsam_check_password: dsdb_trust_routing_table_load() %s\n", + nt_errstr(status)); + return status; + } + + tdo = dsdb_trust_routing_by_name(trt, effective_domain); + if (tdo == NULL) { + DBG_DEBUG("%s is not a known TLN (DC)\n", + effective_domain); + TALLOC_FREE(trt); + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + if (!(tdo->trust_attributes & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST)) { + DBG_DEBUG("%s is not a TLN in our forest (DC)\n", + effective_domain); + TALLOC_FREE(trt); + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + /* + * This principal is within our forest. + * we'll later do a crack_name_to_nt4_name() + * to check if it's in our domain. + */ + TALLOC_FREE(trt); + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +static const struct auth_operations sam_ignoredomain_ops = { + .name = "sam_ignoredomain", + .want_check = authsam_ignoredomain_want_check, + .check_password_send = authsam_check_password_send, + .check_password_recv = authsam_check_password_recv, +}; + +static const struct auth_operations sam_ops = { + .name = "sam", + .want_check = authsam_want_check, + .check_password_send = authsam_check_password_send, + .check_password_recv = authsam_check_password_recv, +}; + +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth4_sam_init(TALLOC_CTX *); +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth4_sam_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx) +{ + NTSTATUS ret; + + ret = auth_register(ctx, &sam_ops); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) { + DEBUG(0,("Failed to register 'sam' auth backend!\n")); + return ret; + } + + ret = auth_register(ctx, &sam_ignoredomain_ops); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) { + DEBUG(0,("Failed to register 'sam_ignoredomain' auth backend!\n")); + return ret; + } + + return ret; +} diff --git a/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_server_service.c b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_server_service.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7fbb1fe --- /dev/null +++ b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_server_service.c @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/* + Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + Password and authentication handling + Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2010 + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +*/ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "auth/auth.h" + +#undef DBGC_CLASS +#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH + +NTSTATUS server_service_auth_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx) +{ + return auth4_init(); +} diff --git a/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_simple.c b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_simple.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..605ed9e --- /dev/null +++ b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_simple.c @@ -0,0 +1,221 @@ +/* + Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + + auth functions + + Copyright (C) Simo Sorce 2005 + Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2005 + Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2005 + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +*/ + +#include "includes.h" +#include <tevent.h> +#include "lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h" +#include "auth/auth.h" +#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h" +#include "lib/param/param.h" + +#undef DBGC_CLASS +#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH + +struct authenticate_ldap_simple_bind_state { + bool using_tls; + struct auth4_context *auth_context; + struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info; + struct auth_session_info *session_info; +}; + +static void authenticate_ldap_simple_bind_done(struct tevent_req *subreq); + +_PUBLIC_ struct tevent_req *authenticate_ldap_simple_bind_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct tevent_context *ev, + struct imessaging_context *msg, + struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx, + struct tsocket_address *remote_address, + struct tsocket_address *local_address, + bool using_tls, + const char *dn, + const char *password) +{ + struct tevent_req *req = NULL; + struct authenticate_ldap_simple_bind_state *state = NULL; + struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = NULL; + const char *nt4_domain = NULL; + const char *nt4_username = NULL; + struct tevent_req *subreq = NULL; + NTSTATUS status; + + req = tevent_req_create(mem_ctx, &state, + struct authenticate_ldap_simple_bind_state); + if (req == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + state->using_tls = using_tls; + + status = auth_context_create(state, ev, msg, lp_ctx, + &state->auth_context); + if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) { + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + + user_info = talloc_zero(state, struct auth_usersupplied_info); + if (tevent_req_nomem(user_info, req)) { + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + state->user_info = user_info; + + user_info->client.account_name = dn; + /* No client.domain_name, use account_name instead */ + /* user_info->mapped.* will be filled below */ + + user_info->workstation_name = lpcfg_netbios_name(lp_ctx); + + user_info->remote_host = remote_address; + user_info->local_host = local_address; + + user_info->service_description = "LDAP"; + + if (using_tls) { + user_info->auth_description = "simple bind/TLS"; + } else { + user_info->auth_description = "simple bind"; + } + + user_info->password_state = AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN; + user_info->password.plaintext = talloc_strdup(user_info, password); + if (tevent_req_nomem(user_info->password.plaintext, req)) { + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + + user_info->flags = USER_INFO_CASE_INSENSITIVE_USERNAME | + USER_INFO_DONT_CHECK_UNIX_ACCOUNT; + + user_info->logon_parameters = + MSV1_0_ALLOW_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT | + MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT | + MSV1_0_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED | + MSV1_0_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD_SUPPLIED; + + status = crack_auto_name_to_nt4_name(state, state->auth_context->sam_ctx, + dn, &nt4_domain, &nt4_username); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + log_authentication_event(msg, lp_ctx, + &state->auth_context->start_time, + user_info, status, + NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL /* client_audit_info */, + NULL /* server_audit_info */); + } + if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) { + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + + user_info->orig_client = user_info->client; + user_info->client.account_name = nt4_username; + user_info->client.domain_name = nt4_domain; + user_info->cracknames_called = true; + + subreq = auth_check_password_send(state, ev, + state->auth_context, + state->user_info); + if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) { + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, authenticate_ldap_simple_bind_done, req); + + return req; +} + +static void authenticate_ldap_simple_bind_done(struct tevent_req *subreq) +{ + struct tevent_req *req = + tevent_req_callback_data(subreq, + struct tevent_req); + struct authenticate_ldap_simple_bind_state *state = + tevent_req_data(req, + struct authenticate_ldap_simple_bind_state); + struct auth4_context *auth_context = state->auth_context; + struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = state->user_info; + const char *nt4_username = user_info->mapped.account_name; + const struct tsocket_address *remote_address = user_info->remote_host; + const struct tsocket_address *local_address = user_info->local_host; + const char *transport_protection = AUTHZ_TRANSPORT_PROTECTION_NONE; + struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc = NULL; + uint8_t authoritative = 1; + uint32_t flags = 0; + NTSTATUS nt_status; + + if (state->using_tls) { + transport_protection = AUTHZ_TRANSPORT_PROTECTION_TLS; + } + + nt_status = auth_check_password_recv(subreq, state, + &user_info_dc, + &authoritative); + TALLOC_FREE(subreq); + if (tevent_req_nterror(req, nt_status)) { + return; + } + + flags = AUTH_SESSION_INFO_DEFAULT_GROUPS; + if (!(user_info_dc->info->user_flags & NETLOGON_GUEST)) { + flags |= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_AUTHENTICATED; + } + + nt_status = auth_context->generate_session_info(auth_context, + state, + user_info_dc, + nt4_username, + flags, + &state->session_info); + if (tevent_req_nterror(req, nt_status)) { + return; + } + + log_successful_authz_event(auth_context->msg_ctx, + auth_context->lp_ctx, + remote_address, + local_address, + "LDAP", + "simple bind", + transport_protection, + state->session_info, + NULL /* client_audit_info */, + NULL /* server_audit_info */); + + tevent_req_done(req); +} + +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS authenticate_ldap_simple_bind_recv(struct tevent_req *req, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct auth_session_info **session_info) +{ + struct authenticate_ldap_simple_bind_state *state = + tevent_req_data(req, + struct authenticate_ldap_simple_bind_state); + NTSTATUS status; + + *session_info = NULL; + + if (tevent_req_is_nterror(req, &status)) { + tevent_req_received(req); + return status; + } + + *session_info = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &state->session_info); + tevent_req_received(req); + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} diff --git a/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_util.c b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_util.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..58e97fb --- /dev/null +++ b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_util.c @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +/* + Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + Authentication utility functions + Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998 + Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001 + Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 2000-2001 + Copyright (C) Rafal Szczesniak 2002 + Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2005 + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +*/ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "auth/auth.h" +#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h" +#include "param/param.h" +#include "auth/ntlm/auth_proto.h" +#include "librpc/gen_ndr/drsuapi.h" +#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h" +#include "lib/crypto/gnutls_helpers.h" + +#undef DBGC_CLASS +#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH + +/**************************************************************************** + Create an auth_usersupplied_data structure after appropriate mapping. +****************************************************************************/ + +NTSTATUS encrypt_user_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct auth4_context *auth_context, + enum auth_password_state to_state, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info_in, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info **user_info_encrypted) +{ + int rc; + NTSTATUS nt_status; + struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info_temp; + switch (to_state) { + case AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE: + switch (user_info_in->password_state) { + case AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN: + { + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info_temp2; + nt_status = encrypt_user_info(mem_ctx, auth_context, + AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH, + user_info_in, &user_info_temp2); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + return nt_status; + } + user_info_in = user_info_temp2; + + FALL_THROUGH; + } + case AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH: + { + uint8_t chal[8]; + DATA_BLOB chall_blob; + user_info_temp = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct auth_usersupplied_info); + if (!user_info_temp) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + if (!talloc_reference(user_info_temp, user_info_in)) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + *user_info_temp = *user_info_in; + user_info_temp->password_state = to_state; + + nt_status = auth_get_challenge(auth_context, chal); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + return nt_status; + } + + chall_blob = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, chal, 8); + if (lpcfg_client_ntlmv2_auth(auth_context->lp_ctx)) { + DATA_BLOB names_blob = NTLMv2_generate_names_blob(mem_ctx, lpcfg_netbios_name(auth_context->lp_ctx), lpcfg_workgroup(auth_context->lp_ctx)); + DATA_BLOB lmv2_response, ntlmv2_response, lmv2_session_key, ntlmv2_session_key; + + if (!SMBNTLMv2encrypt_hash(user_info_temp, + user_info_in->client.account_name, + user_info_in->client.domain_name, + user_info_in->password.hash.nt->hash, + &chall_blob, + NULL, /* server_timestamp */ + &names_blob, + &lmv2_response, &ntlmv2_response, + &lmv2_session_key, &ntlmv2_session_key)) { + data_blob_free(&names_blob); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + data_blob_free(&names_blob); + user_info_temp->password.response.lanman = lmv2_response; + user_info_temp->password.response.nt = ntlmv2_response; + + data_blob_free(&lmv2_session_key); + data_blob_free(&ntlmv2_session_key); + } else { + DATA_BLOB blob = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 24); + rc = SMBOWFencrypt(user_info_in->password.hash.nt->hash, chal, blob.data); + if (rc != 0) { + return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DISABLED_BY_POLICY_OTHER); + } + user_info_temp->password.response.nt = blob; + if (lpcfg_client_lanman_auth(auth_context->lp_ctx) && user_info_in->password.hash.lanman) { + DATA_BLOB lm_blob = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 24); + rc = SMBOWFencrypt(user_info_in->password.hash.lanman->hash, chal, blob.data); + if (rc != 0) { + return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DISABLED_BY_POLICY_OTHER); + } + user_info_temp->password.response.lanman = lm_blob; + } else { + /* if not sending the LM password, send the NT password twice */ + user_info_temp->password.response.lanman = user_info_temp->password.response.nt; + } + } + + user_info_in = user_info_temp; + + FALL_THROUGH; + } + case AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE: + *user_info_encrypted = user_info_in; + } + break; + case AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH: + { + switch (user_info_in->password_state) { + case AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN: + { + struct samr_Password lanman; + struct samr_Password nt; + + user_info_temp = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct auth_usersupplied_info); + if (!user_info_temp) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + if (!talloc_reference(user_info_temp, user_info_in)) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + *user_info_temp = *user_info_in; + user_info_temp->password_state = to_state; + + if (E_deshash(user_info_in->password.plaintext, lanman.hash)) { + user_info_temp->password.hash.lanman = talloc(user_info_temp, + struct samr_Password); + *user_info_temp->password.hash.lanman = lanman; + } else { + user_info_temp->password.hash.lanman = NULL; + } + + E_md4hash(user_info_in->password.plaintext, nt.hash); + user_info_temp->password.hash.nt = talloc(user_info_temp, + struct samr_Password); + *user_info_temp->password.hash.nt = nt; + + user_info_in = user_info_temp; + + FALL_THROUGH; + } + case AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH: + *user_info_encrypted = user_info_in; + break; + default: + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + break; + } + break; + } + default: + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} diff --git a/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_winbind.c b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_winbind.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b1cc51 --- /dev/null +++ b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_winbind.c @@ -0,0 +1,326 @@ +/* + Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + + Winbind authentication mechanism + + Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2000 + Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001 - 2002 + Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2005 + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +*/ + +#include "includes.h" +#include <tevent.h> +#include "../lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h" +#include "auth/auth.h" +#include "auth/ntlm/auth_proto.h" +#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_winbind_c.h" +#include "lib/messaging/irpc.h" +#include "param/param.h" +#include "nsswitch/libwbclient/wbclient.h" +#include "auth/auth_sam_reply.h" +#include "libcli/security/security.h" +#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h" +#include "auth/auth_sam.h" + +#undef DBGC_CLASS +#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH + +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth4_winbind_init(TALLOC_CTX *); + +static NTSTATUS winbind_want_check(struct auth_method_context *ctx, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info) +{ + if (!user_info->mapped.account_name || !*user_info->mapped.account_name) { + return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + /* TODO: maybe limit the user scope to remote users only */ + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +struct winbind_check_password_state { + struct auth_method_context *ctx; + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info; + struct winbind_SamLogon req; + struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc; + bool authoritative; +}; + +static void winbind_check_password_done(struct tevent_req *subreq); + +/* + Authenticate a user with a challenge/response + using IRPC to the winbind task +*/ +static struct tevent_req *winbind_check_password_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct tevent_context *ev, + struct auth_method_context *ctx, + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info) +{ + struct tevent_req *req = NULL; + struct winbind_check_password_state *state = NULL; + NTSTATUS status; + struct dcerpc_binding_handle *irpc_handle; + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info_new; + struct netr_IdentityInfo *identity_info; + struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx; + struct tevent_req *subreq = NULL; + + req = tevent_req_create(mem_ctx, &state, + struct winbind_check_password_state); + if (req == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + state->ctx = ctx; + state->user_info = user_info; + state->authoritative = true; + + msg_ctx = imessaging_client_init(state, ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx, ev); + if (msg_ctx == NULL) { + DEBUG(1, ("imessaging_init failed\n")); + tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_SERVER_STATE); + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + + irpc_handle = irpc_binding_handle_by_name(state, msg_ctx, + "winbind_server", + &ndr_table_winbind); + if (irpc_handle == NULL) { + DEBUG(0, ("Winbind authentication for [%s]\\[%s] failed, " + "no winbind_server running!\n", + user_info->client.domain_name, user_info->client.account_name)); + tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_NO_LOGON_SERVERS); + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + + /* + * 120 seconds should be enough even for trusted domains. + * + * Currently winbindd has a much lower limit. + * And tests with Windows RODCs show that it + * returns NO_LOGON_SERVERS after 90-100 seconds + * if it can't reach any RWDC. + */ + dcerpc_binding_handle_set_timeout(irpc_handle, 120); + + if (user_info->flags & USER_INFO_INTERACTIVE_LOGON) { + struct netr_PasswordInfo *password_info; + + status = encrypt_user_info(state, ctx->auth_ctx, AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH, + user_info, &user_info_new); + if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) { + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + user_info = user_info_new; + + password_info = talloc_zero(state, struct netr_PasswordInfo); + if (tevent_req_nomem(password_info, req)) { + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + + password_info->lmpassword = *user_info->password.hash.lanman; + password_info->ntpassword = *user_info->password.hash.nt; + + identity_info = &password_info->identity_info; + state->req.in.logon_level = 1; + state->req.in.logon.password= password_info; + } else { + struct netr_NetworkInfo *network_info; + uint8_t chal[8]; + + status = encrypt_user_info(state, ctx->auth_ctx, AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE, + user_info, &user_info_new); + if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) { + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + user_info = user_info_new; + + network_info = talloc_zero(state, struct netr_NetworkInfo); + if (tevent_req_nomem(network_info, req)) { + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + + status = auth_get_challenge(ctx->auth_ctx, chal); + if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) { + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + + memcpy(network_info->challenge, chal, sizeof(network_info->challenge)); + + network_info->nt.length = user_info->password.response.nt.length; + network_info->nt.data = user_info->password.response.nt.data; + + network_info->lm.length = user_info->password.response.lanman.length; + network_info->lm.data = user_info->password.response.lanman.data; + + identity_info = &network_info->identity_info; + state->req.in.logon_level = 2; + state->req.in.logon.network = network_info; + } + + identity_info->domain_name.string = user_info->client.domain_name; + identity_info->parameter_control = user_info->logon_parameters; /* see MSV1_0_* */ + identity_info->logon_id = user_info->logon_id; + identity_info->account_name.string = user_info->client.account_name; + identity_info->workstation.string = user_info->workstation_name; + + state->req.in.validation_level = 6; + + subreq = dcerpc_winbind_SamLogon_r_send(state, ev, irpc_handle, + &state->req); + if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) { + return tevent_req_post(req, ev); + } + tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, + winbind_check_password_done, + req); + + return req; +} + +static void winbind_check_password_done(struct tevent_req *subreq) +{ + struct tevent_req *req = + tevent_req_callback_data(subreq, + struct tevent_req); + struct winbind_check_password_state *state = + tevent_req_data(req, + struct winbind_check_password_state); + struct auth_method_context *ctx = state->ctx; + const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = state->user_info; + struct ldb_dn *domain_dn = NULL; + const char *nt4_domain = NULL; + const char *nt4_account = NULL; + struct ldb_message *msg = NULL; + NTSTATUS status; + + status = dcerpc_winbind_SamLogon_r_recv(subreq, state); + if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_IO_TIMEOUT)) { + status = NT_STATUS_NO_LOGON_SERVERS; + } + TALLOC_FREE(subreq); + if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) { + return; + } + + status = state->req.out.result; + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + if (!state->req.out.authoritative) { + state->authoritative = false; + } + tevent_req_nterror(req, status); + return; + } + + status = make_user_info_dc_netlogon_validation(state, + user_info->client.account_name, + state->req.in.validation_level, + &state->req.out.validation, + true, /* This user was authenticated */ + &state->user_info_dc); + if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) { + return; + } + + nt4_domain = state->user_info_dc->info->domain_name; + nt4_account = state->user_info_dc->info->account_name; + + if (lpcfg_is_mydomain(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx, nt4_domain)) { + domain_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx); + } + + if (domain_dn != NULL) { + /* + * At best, reset the badPwdCount to 0 if the account exists. + * This means that lockouts happen at a badPwdCount earlier than + * normal, but makes it more fault tolerant. + */ + status = authsam_search_account(state, ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, + nt4_account, domain_dn, &msg); + if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + status = authsam_logon_success_accounting( + ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, msg, + domain_dn, + user_info->flags & USER_INFO_INTERACTIVE_LOGON, + NULL, NULL); + if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) { + return; + } + } + } + + /* + * We need to expand group memberships within our local domain, + * as the token might be generated by a trusted domain, unless we're + * an RODC. + */ + status = authsam_update_user_info_dc(state->user_info_dc, + ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, + state->user_info_dc); + if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) { + return; + } + + tevent_req_done(req); +} + +static NTSTATUS winbind_check_password_recv(struct tevent_req *req, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct auth_user_info_dc **user_info_dc, + const struct authn_audit_info **client_audit_info, + const struct authn_audit_info **server_audit_info, + bool *pauthoritative) +{ + struct winbind_check_password_state *state = + tevent_req_data(req, + struct winbind_check_password_state); + NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK; + + *pauthoritative = state->authoritative; + *client_audit_info = NULL; + *server_audit_info = NULL; + + if (tevent_req_is_nterror(req, &status)) { + tevent_req_received(req); + return status; + } + + *user_info_dc = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &state->user_info_dc); + + tevent_req_received(req); + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +static const struct auth_operations winbind_ops = { + .name = "winbind", + .want_check = winbind_want_check, + .check_password_send = winbind_check_password_send, + .check_password_recv = winbind_check_password_recv +}; + +_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth4_winbind_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx) +{ + NTSTATUS ret; + + ret = auth_register(ctx, &winbind_ops); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) { + DEBUG(0,("Failed to register 'winbind' auth backend!\n")); + return ret; + } + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} diff --git a/source4/auth/ntlm/wscript_build b/source4/auth/ntlm/wscript_build new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0698f6b --- /dev/null +++ b/source4/auth/ntlm/wscript_build @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python + +bld.SAMBA_MODULE('auth4_sam_module', + source='auth_sam.c', + subsystem='auth4', + init_function='auth4_sam_init', + deps='samdb auth4_sam NTLMSSP_COMMON samba-hostconfig RPC_NDR_IRPC MESSAGING db-glue authn_policy_util', + enabled=bld.AD_DC_BUILD_IS_ENABLED() + ) + + +bld.SAMBA_MODULE('auth4_anonymous', + source='auth_anonymous.c', + subsystem='auth4', + init_function='auth4_anonymous_init', + deps='tevent' + ) + + +bld.SAMBA_MODULE('auth4_winbind', + source='auth_winbind.c', + subsystem='auth4', + init_function='auth4_winbind_init', + deps='RPC_NDR_WINBIND MESSAGING wbclient' + ) + + +bld.SAMBA_MODULE('auth4_developer', + source='auth_developer.c', + subsystem='auth4', + init_function='auth4_developer_init', + deps='tevent', + enabled=bld.env.DEVELOPER_MODE + ) + + +bld.SAMBA_LIBRARY('auth4', + source='auth.c auth_util.c auth_simple.c', + autoproto='auth_proto.h', + deps='samba-util samba-security samdb samba-credentials tevent-util LIBWBCLIENT_OLD auth_unix_token samba-modules KERBEROS_UTIL', + private_library=True + ) + +bld.SAMBA_MODULE('service_auth', + source='auth_server_service.c', + subsystem='service', + init_function='server_service_auth_init', + deps='auth4', + internal_module=True + ) + |