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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 09:22:09 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 09:22:09 +0000 |
commit | 43a97878ce14b72f0981164f87f2e35e14151312 (patch) | |
tree | 620249daf56c0258faa40cbdcf9cfba06de2a846 /third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/aead.rs | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | firefox-upstream.tar.xz firefox-upstream.zip |
Adding upstream version 110.0.1.upstream/110.0.1upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/aead.rs')
-rw-r--r-- | third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/aead.rs | 320 |
1 files changed, 320 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/aead.rs b/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/aead.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7ffb402b64 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/aead.rs @@ -0,0 +1,320 @@ +use super::err::secstatus_to_res; +use super::p11::sys::{ + self, PK11Context, PK11_AEADOp, PK11_CreateContextBySymKey, PRBool, CKA_DECRYPT, CKA_ENCRYPT, + CKA_NSS_MESSAGE, CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR, CKG_NO_GENERATE, CKM_AES_GCM, CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE, CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE, +}; +use super::p11::{Item, SymKey}; +use crate::err::{Error, Res}; +use crate::hpke::Aead as AeadId; +use log::trace; +use std::convert::{TryFrom, TryInto}; +use std::mem; +use std::os::raw::c_int; + +/// All the nonces are the same length. Exploit that. +pub const NONCE_LEN: usize = 12; +/// The portion of the nonce that is a counter. +const COUNTER_LEN: usize = mem::size_of::<SequenceNumber>(); +/// The NSS API insists on us identifying the tag separately, which is awful. +/// All of the AEAD functions here have a tag of this length, so use a fixed offset. +const TAG_LEN: usize = 16; + +pub type SequenceNumber = u64; + +/// All the lengths used by `PK11_AEADOp` are signed. This converts to that. +fn c_int_len<T>(l: T) -> c_int +where + T: TryInto<c_int>, + T::Error: std::error::Error, +{ + l.try_into().unwrap() +} + +unsafe fn destroy_aead_context(ctx: *mut PK11Context) { + sys::PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PRBool::from(true)); +} +scoped_ptr!(Context, PK11Context, destroy_aead_context); + +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum Mode { + Encrypt, + Decrypt, +} + +impl Mode { + fn p11mode(self) -> CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE { + CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE::from( + CKA_NSS_MESSAGE + | match self { + Self::Encrypt => CKA_ENCRYPT, + Self::Decrypt => CKA_DECRYPT, + }, + ) + } +} + +/// This is an AEAD instance that uses the +pub struct Aead { + mode: Mode, + ctx: Context, + nonce_base: [u8; NONCE_LEN], +} + +impl Aead { + fn mech(algorithm: AeadId) -> CK_MECHANISM_TYPE { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE::from(match algorithm { + // The key size determines which AES variant is used. + AeadId::Aes128Gcm | AeadId::Aes256Gcm => CKM_AES_GCM, + AeadId::ChaCha20Poly1305 => CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + }) + } + + #[cfg(test)] + pub fn import_key(algorithm: AeadId, key: &[u8]) -> Res<SymKey> { + let slot = super::p11::Slot::internal()?; + let ptr = unsafe { + sys::PK11_ImportSymKey( + *slot, + Self::mech(algorithm), + sys::PK11Origin::PK11_OriginUnwrap, + sys::CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE::from(sys::CKA_ENCRYPT | sys::CKA_DECRYPT), + &mut super::p11::Item::wrap(key), + std::ptr::null_mut(), + ) + }; + SymKey::from_ptr(ptr) + } + + pub fn new( + mode: Mode, + algorithm: AeadId, + key: &SymKey, + nonce_base: [u8; NONCE_LEN], + ) -> Res<Self> { + trace!( + "New AEAD: key={} nonce_base={}", + hex::encode(key.key_data()?), + hex::encode(nonce_base) + ); + + let ptr = unsafe { + PK11_CreateContextBySymKey( + Self::mech(algorithm), + mode.p11mode(), + **key, + &Item::wrap(&nonce_base[..]), + ) + }; + Ok(Self { + mode, + ctx: Context::from_ptr(ptr)?, + nonce_base, + }) + } + + pub fn seal(&mut self, aad: &[u8], pt: &[u8]) -> Res<Vec<u8>> { + assert_eq!(self.mode, Mode::Encrypt); + // A copy for the nonce generator to write into. But we don't use the value. + let mut nonce = self.nonce_base; + // Ciphertext with enough space for the tag. + // Even though we give the operation a separate buffer for the tag, + // reserve the capacity on allocation. + let mut ct = vec![0; pt.len() + TAG_LEN]; + let mut ct_len: c_int = 0; + let mut tag = vec![0; TAG_LEN]; + secstatus_to_res(unsafe { + PK11_AEADOp( + *self.ctx, + CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION::from(CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR), + c_int_len(NONCE_LEN - COUNTER_LEN), // Fixed portion of the nonce. + nonce.as_mut_ptr(), + c_int_len(nonce.len()), + aad.as_ptr(), + c_int_len(aad.len()), + ct.as_mut_ptr(), + &mut ct_len, + c_int_len(ct.len()), // signed :( + tag.as_mut_ptr(), + c_int_len(tag.len()), + pt.as_ptr(), + c_int_len(pt.len()), + ) + })?; + ct.truncate(usize::try_from(ct_len).unwrap()); + debug_assert_eq!(ct.len(), pt.len()); + ct.append(&mut tag); + Ok(ct) + } + + pub fn open(&mut self, aad: &[u8], seq: SequenceNumber, ct: &[u8]) -> Res<Vec<u8>> { + assert_eq!(self.mode, Mode::Decrypt); + let mut nonce = self.nonce_base; + for (i, n) in nonce.iter_mut().rev().take(COUNTER_LEN).enumerate() { + *n ^= u8::try_from((seq >> (8 * i)) & 0xff).unwrap(); + } + let mut pt = vec![0; ct.len()]; // NSS needs more space than it uses for plaintext. + let mut pt_len: c_int = 0; + let pt_expected = ct.len().checked_sub(TAG_LEN).ok_or(Error::Truncated)?; + secstatus_to_res(unsafe { + PK11_AEADOp( + *self.ctx, + CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION::from(CKG_NO_GENERATE), + c_int_len(NONCE_LEN - COUNTER_LEN), // Fixed portion of the nonce. + nonce.as_mut_ptr(), + c_int_len(nonce.len()), + aad.as_ptr(), + c_int_len(aad.len()), + pt.as_mut_ptr(), + &mut pt_len, + c_int_len(pt.len()), // signed :( + ct.as_ptr().add(pt_expected) as *mut _, // const cast :( + c_int_len(TAG_LEN), + ct.as_ptr(), + c_int_len(pt_expected), + ) + })?; + let len = usize::try_from(pt_len).unwrap(); + debug_assert_eq!(len, pt_expected); + pt.truncate(len); + Ok(pt) + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod test { + use super::super::super::hpke::Aead as AeadId; + use super::super::init; + use super::{Aead, Mode, SequenceNumber, NONCE_LEN}; + + /// Check that the first invocation of encryption matches expected values. + /// Also check decryption of the same. + fn check0( + algorithm: AeadId, + key: &[u8], + nonce: &[u8; NONCE_LEN], + aad: &[u8], + pt: &[u8], + ct: &[u8], + ) { + init(); + let k = Aead::import_key(algorithm, key).unwrap(); + + let mut enc = Aead::new(Mode::Encrypt, algorithm, &k, *nonce).unwrap(); + let ciphertext = enc.seal(aad, pt).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(&ciphertext[..], ct); + + let mut dec = Aead::new(Mode::Decrypt, algorithm, &k, *nonce).unwrap(); + let plaintext = dec.open(aad, 0, ct).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(&plaintext[..], pt); + } + + fn decrypt( + algorithm: AeadId, + key: &[u8], + nonce: &[u8; NONCE_LEN], + seq: SequenceNumber, + aad: &[u8], + pt: &[u8], + ct: &[u8], + ) { + let k = Aead::import_key(algorithm, key).unwrap(); + let mut dec = Aead::new(Mode::Decrypt, algorithm, &k, *nonce).unwrap(); + let plaintext = dec.open(aad, seq, ct).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(&plaintext[..], pt); + } + + /// This tests the AEAD in QUIC in combination with the HKDF code. + /// This is an AEAD-only example. + #[test] + fn quic_retry() { + const KEY: &[u8] = &[ + 0xbe, 0x0c, 0x69, 0x0b, 0x9f, 0x66, 0x57, 0x5a, 0x1d, 0x76, 0x6b, 0x54, 0xe3, 0x68, + 0xc8, 0x4e, + ]; + const NONCE: &[u8; NONCE_LEN] = &[ + 0x46, 0x15, 0x99, 0xd3, 0x5d, 0x63, 0x2b, 0xf2, 0x23, 0x98, 0x25, 0xbb, + ]; + const AAD: &[u8] = &[ + 0x08, 0x83, 0x94, 0xc8, 0xf0, 0x3e, 0x51, 0x57, 0x08, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + 0x00, 0x08, 0xf0, 0x67, 0xa5, 0x50, 0x2a, 0x42, 0x62, 0xb5, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x6b, 0x65, + 0x6e, + ]; + const CT: &[u8] = &[ + 0x04, 0xa2, 0x65, 0xba, 0x2e, 0xff, 0x4d, 0x82, 0x90, 0x58, 0xfb, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x24, + 0x96, 0xba, + ]; + check0(AeadId::Aes128Gcm, KEY, NONCE, AAD, &[], CT); + } + + #[test] + fn quic_server_initial() { + const ALG: AeadId = AeadId::Aes128Gcm; + const KEY: &[u8] = &[ + 0xcf, 0x3a, 0x53, 0x31, 0x65, 0x3c, 0x36, 0x4c, 0x88, 0xf0, 0xf3, 0x79, 0xb6, 0x06, + 0x7e, 0x37, + ]; + const NONCE_BASE: &[u8; NONCE_LEN] = &[ + 0x0a, 0xc1, 0x49, 0x3c, 0xa1, 0x90, 0x58, 0x53, 0xb0, 0xbb, 0xa0, 0x3e, + ]; + // Note that this integrates the sequence number of 1 from the example, + // otherwise we can't use a sequence number of 0 to encrypt. + const NONCE: &[u8; NONCE_LEN] = &[ + 0x0a, 0xc1, 0x49, 0x3c, 0xa1, 0x90, 0x58, 0x53, 0xb0, 0xbb, 0xa0, 0x3f, + ]; + const AAD: &[u8] = &[ + 0xc1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x08, 0xf0, 0x67, 0xa5, 0x50, 0x2a, 0x42, 0x62, + 0xb5, 0x00, 0x40, 0x75, 0x00, 0x01, + ]; + const PT: &[u8] = &[ + 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x40, 0x5a, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x56, 0x03, + 0x03, 0xee, 0xfc, 0xe7, 0xf7, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0xa1, 0xd1, 0x63, 0x2e, 0x96, 0x67, 0x78, + 0x25, 0xdd, 0xf7, 0x39, 0x88, 0xcf, 0xc7, 0x98, 0x25, 0xdf, 0x56, 0x6d, 0xc5, 0x43, + 0x0b, 0x9a, 0x04, 0x5a, 0x12, 0x00, 0x13, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2e, 0x00, 0x33, 0x00, + 0x24, 0x00, 0x1d, 0x00, 0x20, 0x9d, 0x3c, 0x94, 0x0d, 0x89, 0x69, 0x0b, 0x84, 0xd0, + 0x8a, 0x60, 0x99, 0x3c, 0x14, 0x4e, 0xca, 0x68, 0x4d, 0x10, 0x81, 0x28, 0x7c, 0x83, + 0x4d, 0x53, 0x11, 0xbc, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0xb9, 0xda, 0x1a, 0x00, 0x2b, 0x00, 0x02, 0x03, + 0x04, + ]; + const CT: &[u8] = &[ + 0x5a, 0x48, 0x2c, 0xd0, 0x99, 0x1c, 0xd2, 0x5b, 0x0a, 0xac, 0x40, 0x6a, 0x58, 0x16, + 0xb6, 0x39, 0x41, 0x00, 0xf3, 0x7a, 0x1c, 0x69, 0x79, 0x75, 0x54, 0x78, 0x0b, 0xb3, + 0x8c, 0xc5, 0xa9, 0x9f, 0x5e, 0xde, 0x4c, 0xf7, 0x3c, 0x3e, 0xc2, 0x49, 0x3a, 0x18, + 0x39, 0xb3, 0xdb, 0xcb, 0xa3, 0xf6, 0xea, 0x46, 0xc5, 0xb7, 0x68, 0x4d, 0xf3, 0x54, + 0x8e, 0x7d, 0xde, 0xb9, 0xc3, 0xbf, 0x9c, 0x73, 0xcc, 0x3f, 0x3b, 0xde, 0xd7, 0x4b, + 0x56, 0x2b, 0xfb, 0x19, 0xfb, 0x84, 0x02, 0x2f, 0x8e, 0xf4, 0xcd, 0xd9, 0x37, 0x95, + 0xd7, 0x7d, 0x06, 0xed, 0xbb, 0x7a, 0xaf, 0x2f, 0x58, 0x89, 0x18, 0x50, 0xab, 0xbd, + 0xca, 0x3d, 0x20, 0x39, 0x8c, 0x27, 0x64, 0x56, 0xcb, 0xc4, 0x21, 0x58, 0x40, 0x7d, + 0xd0, 0x74, 0xee, + ]; + check0(ALG, KEY, NONCE, AAD, PT, CT); + decrypt(ALG, KEY, NONCE_BASE, 1, AAD, PT, CT); + } + + #[test] + fn quic_chacha() { + const ALG: AeadId = AeadId::ChaCha20Poly1305; + const KEY: &[u8] = &[ + 0xc6, 0xd9, 0x8f, 0xf3, 0x44, 0x1c, 0x3f, 0xe1, 0xb2, 0x18, 0x20, 0x94, 0xf6, 0x9c, + 0xaa, 0x2e, 0xd4, 0xb7, 0x16, 0xb6, 0x54, 0x88, 0x96, 0x0a, 0x7a, 0x98, 0x49, 0x79, + 0xfb, 0x23, 0xe1, 0xc8, + ]; + const NONCE_BASE: &[u8; NONCE_LEN] = &[ + 0xe0, 0x45, 0x9b, 0x34, 0x74, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0xe4, 0x4a, 0x41, 0xc1, 0x44, + ]; + // Note that this integrates the sequence number of 654360564 from the example, + // otherwise we can't use a sequence number of 0 to encrypt. + const NONCE: &[u8; NONCE_LEN] = &[ + 0xe0, 0x45, 0x9b, 0x34, 0x74, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0xe4, 0x6d, 0x41, 0x7e, 0xb0, + ]; + const AAD: &[u8] = &[0x42, 0x00, 0xbf, 0xf4]; + const PT: &[u8] = &[0x01]; + const CT: &[u8] = &[ + 0x65, 0x5e, 0x5c, 0xd5, 0x5c, 0x41, 0xf6, 0x90, 0x80, 0x57, 0x5d, 0x79, 0x99, 0xc2, + 0x5a, 0x5b, 0xfb, + ]; + check0(ALG, KEY, NONCE, AAD, PT, CT); + // Now use the real nonce and sequence number from the example. + decrypt(ALG, KEY, NONCE_BASE, 654_360_564, AAD, PT, CT); + } +} |